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ABSTRACT 
As the United States enters the decade of the 1990s, it is essential 
to review the guidance and policies for our force structures. At the 
focal point of discussion on future force structures for the United States 
is the strategic nuclear forces. The strategic nuclear force structure 
for the United States has been predicated on the concept of a Triad, which 
consists of three legs, referred to as land-based, sea-based, and manned 
bombers. Each of the legs consists of separate components. Understanding 
the tradition of the United States strategic deterrent being predicated on 
the Triad concept, it is concluded that with the changing international 
environment and the declaratory statements for continuing to decrease the 
Defense Budget, a new and realistic review of the factors for determining 
a strategic nuclear force should be researched. Therefore, the intention 
of this thesis is to review and analyze the five factors which may 
contribute to the formulation of a realistic policy for the 1990s with 
regard to United States strategic nuclear forces. The final results of the 
research have indicated sufficient evidence that a policy review of the 
strategic nuclear Triad should be conducted to meet the challenges and 
realities of the 1990s and the 21st Century. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An unrelenting dilemma of the 1990s and the 21st Century will be the 
continued question of nuclear arms and their value to global security. 
The discussion that deals with the dilemma of nuclear arms concentrates on 
the United States' and Soviet Union's Strategic Nuclear Forces and their 
composition. To this end, the essence of this thesis will be a 
reevaluation of the current forces and possible factors that may shape the 
future Strategic Nuclear Forces of the United States. From reviewing our 
current forces and assessing our requirements in the current and future 
environment, it may be possible for the United States to restructure 
strategic nuclear forces of the future. The timeliness of this discussion 
may be only as accurate as yesterday's news reports with regard to the 
changes in the international environment and the floor debates in the 
Houses of Congress between the Administration and the members of Congress. 
With respect to the United States strategic nuclear forces of the 
future, the debate undoubtedly focuses on the force structure of the 
Strategic Nuclear Triad. The Strategic Nuclear Triad consists of three 
"Legs" or methods of delivering strategic nuclear weapons: land 
(Intercontinental Ballistic Nissiles), air (Strategic Bombers), and sea 
(Strategic Nuclear-powered Submarines). The Triad has been utilized by 
the United States for strategic nuclear deterrence since the Eisenhower 
Administration. Consequently, the Triad has been credited as the 
stabilizing force structure that has prevented nuclear war between the 
1 
United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War years. However 
with the dramatic changes in the global environment and the altered 
requirements of United States domestic politics, the possibility of a new 
strategic nuclear force structure should be assessed. Of course, a new 
strategic force structure must be able to meet the requirements of the 
current and our future national security needs while taking into 
consideration the current and future budgetary constraints. 
Before the United States strategic nuclear forces of the future may 
be determined, it appears that a review of the current Presidential 
national security guidance should be undertaken. Utilizing the current 
guidance, a future strategic nuclear force structure may be assessed for 
congruency between present and future force structure in maintaining the 
national security of the United States. For this study, the research has 
centered on four major areas and the impact that each may have in deciding 
the United States strategic nuclear weapon systems. The major areas are: 
1) current strategic threat of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact; 2) 
arms control with regard to a START Treaty and SDI potential to counter 
the threat of nuclear proliferation; 3) current and planned strategic 
weapon systems of the Triad; and 4) Congressional and Administration 
debates on the previous three areas with regard to the appropriate force 
structure within the current and forecasted budgetary constraints. 
A. NATIONAL SECURITY AND PRESIDENTIAL GUIDANCE 
For an insight to the past and the future of our strategic nuclear 
force structure, the appropriate source most logically would be the 
Presidential guidance for the national security of the United States. 
From reviewing the guidance provided in 1987, 1988, and 1990, it is clear 
that both the Bush and Reagan Administrations have placed a high priority 
on maintaining a strong strategic nuclear force. Although the priority 
has been declared, it is significant how each Administration justified the 
requirement. 
The Reagan Administration utilized the past history of the Soviet 
threat as justification. With the Bush Administration, the changes in the 
world environment would not support solely a hard line against the 
Soviets. Also, these changes have fuelled new discussions in Congress to 
modify the defense budget with respect to domestic priorities. Therefore, 
the Bush Administration may be required to alter its strategic force 
structure to obtain cooperation from the Congress in support of the 
national security. 
B. STRATEGIC THREAT 
The primary strategic military threat to the United States will 
continue to be the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is the only nation that 
can gravely endanger the United States through a nuclear weapon attack. 
The challenges for the future are two-fold: first, realization that there 
is and will be a continued Soviet threat; and secondly, the United States 
must work with the Soviets to alleviate the tensions in the world and 
preserve peace. 
The realization that the Soviet Union maintains a strong strategic 
nuclear force does not require much research.  The Soviets have 
assimilated a strong nuclear force built on ICBMs, SLBMs and STRATEGIC 
BOMBERS. The other issue in responding to the Soviet threat is 
understanding the changes that have occurred since 1985 and what permanent 
impact these changes may have. Of course, the center of this issue is the 
leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. 
Finally, the issue of the future of Europe must be addressed with 
respect to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The future of these two 
organizations will most assuredly determine the commitment of the United 
States strategic forces to possible Warsaw Pact targets. These issues will 
be analyzed for determining if the strategic threat has changed and 
whether the changes are significant enough to warrant changes in the 
United States strategic nuclear force. 
C. ARMS CONTROL AND THE START TREATY 
Arms control has assumed a larger role in the future of the strategic 
nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. Currently, the 
vehicle for lowering levels of strategic forces is the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks (START). Both the United States and Soviet Union have 
agreed substantively to reduce their strategic nuclear forces in both 
weapon delivery systems and strategic nuclear warheads. Also, the issue 
of the United States Strategic Defense Initiative (SD1) must be evaluated 
in allowing the United States to safely reduce its strategic nuclear 
forces without fearing a surprise nuclear attack. 
The START Treaty will be assessed from a perspective that the major 
reductions are in fast flying ballistic missiles, while the slower flying 
strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems (bombers) are given preferential 
status. This position is the current negotiating position of the United 
States and should be instrumental in lowering the Soviet advantage in 
HEAVY ICBMS. Of course with any arms control agreement, the discussion of 
verification arises. In the case of the START Treaty, this is a major 
negotiating item. Unlike the INF Treaty, the START Treaty lowers the 
number of nuclear weapon systems and warheads, but does not eliminate an 
entire class of nuclear weapons as the INF Treaty does. Also, the record 
of Soviet compliance must be considered for deciding how useful the START 
Treaty will be in the future. The end result to obtaining a successful 
START Treaty could be a new strategic nuclear force structure for the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
The second arms talk issue that could have direct bearing on the 
United States strategic nuclear forces is SDI. SDI would provide the 
United States with a defensive strategic nuclear capability that we 
currently do not possess. SDI will not ensure complete defense against 
strategic nuclear attack, but will make any thought of a preemptive attack 
less attractive to an aggressor because of the survivability of United 
States retaliatory forces. Also, a discussion of SDI must include the 
problem of nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation. By convincing the 
Soviet Union that it is in the interest of both the United States and 
Soviet Union to proceed with SDI, the United States may be able to shift 
from a strictly offensive strategic nuclear force to a combination of 
offensive/defensive strategic nuclear force structure. 
D. STRATEGIC WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM 
The modernization of the United States strategic nuclear forces began 
early in the Reagan Administration. The intention was to modernize the 
three legs of the strategic Triad: ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles), SLBMS (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles) and Strategic 
Bombers. The modernization program has been both successful and 
unsuccessful in modernization of the strategic nuclear forces. 
First, the strategy for the strategic bomber force was to consist of 
two phases: 1) build B-1B strategic bombers for the 1980s; and 2) develop 
a new bomber for the 1990s and 21st Century. The program of building the 
B-1B has been accomplished and the aircraft are operational, although 
there have been problems with the electronic warfare capability of the 
aircraft. The second phase of enhancing the bomber leg is the B-2 Stealth 
Bomber, which is still undergoing major budgetary problems. 
Second, the improvement of the SLBM leg has centered on the Trident 
submarine and the Trident D-5 SLBM. The program was to modernize the 
submarine force to an all Trident submarine force. The reason for the 
Trident fleet would be to carry the new D-5 SLBM. The new missile would 
give the United States sea-based leg the accuracy, range, and nuclear 
warhead to reliably attack Soviet land-based targets. Currently, Trident 
submarines are continuing to be delivered, although at a slower pace than 
originally desired. The D-5 has completed its operational testing and is 
ready for deployment. The future of the SLBM leg will hinge on many 
developments, but most assuredly the most significant will be the future 
of the United States' ICBMs. 
6 
Third, the ICBM program has attempted to neutralize the Heavy and 
mobile ICBMs of the Soviet Union. The initial program implemented was the 
MX missile, which has multiple warhead capability. The second program 
which has been debated is the road-mobile, single warhead Hidgetman 
missile system. The Midgetman program was initiated to increase the 
difficulty of the Soviets to target United States ICBMs. As an 
alternative to developing an entirely new system such as Midgetman, the MX 
missile has been recommended as a candidate for establishing a rail- 
garrison missile system. At the center of the debate between MX and 
MIDGETMAN is the overriding issue of two missile systems, both vying for 
the same mission--a mission that may change with an arms control 
agreement. 
E. CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE 
Congressional influence in the changing world environment may be the 
prime determining factor of the United States strategic forces of the 
future. The Congress has been conducting hearings on all levels to 
independently evaluate the factors that have been introduced in this 
study. At the heart of Congressional debate is the question of the Soviet 
threat. If the Congress determines that the threat has been markedly 
reduced by real or perceived changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, then Congress will most likely press the executive branch for 
defense reductions. 
Also, Congress and especially the Senate is instrumental in the arms 
control agreement process. Remembering this, the Senate must ratify any 
treaty that is signed by the United States. Therefore, the negotiating 
position and areas of agreement must be supported, or else the treaty will 
not be ratified. With this thought in mind, it is logical to believe the 
type of force structure supported by Congress will be the same force 
structure supported in arms control negotiations. 
Congress will continue to analyze the world environment for new 
policies and strategies that will support lowering the defense budget of 
the United States. This is not to say that cuts will be made at the risk 
of national security, but rather the Congressional Armed Service and 
Budget Committees are going to be evaluating the different factors for 
formulating a new defense budget. Therefore, it should be recognized that 
the cuts in the defense budget will affect the United States strategic 
nuclear forces of the future. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The desired result of this study is a recommendation for a policy on 
determining the strategic nuclear force structure of the future. The 
desired policy recommendation should be highlighted by a strategy that 
will utilize the strengths of the United States technological advantages 
in the areas of nuclear-powered submarines and air- and sea-launched 
cruise missiles, while deemphasizing the area of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles. These recommendations are also in agreement with the 
arms control position that the United States has maintained in the current 
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks. 
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Also, a new strategic policy for strategic nuclear weapon systems may 
require the two affected services (Air Force and Navy) to research such 
concepts as strategic forces being dual-capable with respect to nuclear 
and conventional missions. The Air Force has already seen an advantage to 
this approach with regard to strategic nuclear bombers. Of course, it 
must be noted that this would be looked on as a destabilizing policy by 
many experts because of verification, but in the eyes of Congress and the 
United States general public this approach may appear economically more 
acceptable than a policy built strictly on weapon systems designed solely 
for strategic nuclear war. 
II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND PRESIDENTIAL GUIDANCE 
As the United States enters the decade of the 1990s, the challenges 
will be great. The greatest challenge may well be to determine how the 
security of the United States will be maintained. For the last 40 years 
this challenge and our response has been met by maintaining a policy of 
triplely redundant deterrence that was centered on a strong strategic 
nuclear Triad force structure. For the future this may not be the 
solution especially as the world continually changes. 
The United States will be required to assess its position in the 
global arena and design the appropriate strategy to ensure the national 
security of the United States is preserved. The strategy that is utilized 
will require adjusting present force structures in the Defense Department 
to take advantage of changes in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Of 
course, these changes will require cooperation between the President and 
the Congress to make appropriate decisions on defense issues in a prudent, 
but fashionable manner. 
A. PRESIDENT BUSH'S GUIDANCE 
The decisions that are to be made regarding national security of the 
United States should emulate the posture and priorities that the President 
has articulated. In March, President Bush signed the 1990 report on the 
National Security Strategy of the United States.    The 1990 issue outlined 
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the four broad national  interests and objectives for strategic 
policymaking: 
1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent 
nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people 
secure. 
2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for 
individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home 
and abroad. 
3. A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human 
rights, and democratic institutions. 
4. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with 
allies and friendly nations.1 
These four areas are basically the same broad national interests and 
objectives as the Reagan Administration's; therefore, continuity in 
providing guidance for the national security has been maintained. Of 
course, the 1990 issue takes into account and emphasizes that the United 
States national security strategy is shaped from the totality of the 
domestic and international environment, which is dramatically changing. 
One dramatic change in the international environment is a new Soviet 
leadership participation role since the mid-1980s that has recognized the 
requirement for a calmer international environment in order to concentrate 
on internal crisis in the Soviet Union.2 There has also been other 
changes but with regard to global peace and stability, this may be the 
most influential. 
The importance of the Soviet actions cannot be underestimated because 
this impacts directly on the relationship between the United States and 
'White House, National Security Strategy of the United States,  March 
1990, pp 2-3. 
2Ibid, p 5. 
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the Soviet Union. The relationship is essential and retains strategic 
priority because the Soviet Union is the only other military superpower 
besides the United States. Therefore, the Bush Administration's national 
security goal with regard to the Soviet Union is to move beyond a strategy 
of containment and seek integration of the Soviet Union into the 
international system as a constructive partner.3 
As the United States seeks improvement in relations with the Soviet 
Union, the United States policies do not and will not depend on a 
particular leader or set of leaders in the Soviet Union. It must be 
remembered that a policy that is strictly built on a particular leader 
could change overnight. Thus the Bush Administration, recognizing the 
Soviet Union will remain a formidable military power, advocates the United 
States response to Soviet military changes in force structure and 
modernization will be prudent caution, but a caution the Soviet leadership 
and people should realize is based on uncertainty, not hostility.4 
B. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S GUIDANCE 
The overriding theme of the guidance from President Bush's 1990 issue 
of National Security Strategy of the United States reflects an attitude of 
working together, rather than the guidance of the Reagan Administration. 
President Reagan's 1987 issue of national Security Strategy of the United 
States maintained the perspective that the most significant threat to 
United States security and national interests was the Soviet Union. With 
3Ibid., p 9. 
4Ibid., pp 9-10. 
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regard to the past relations between the United States and Soviet Union, 
President Reagan's 1987 issue stated: 
Fundamental differences in economic, social, and political beliefs 
and objectives lead to an essentially adversarial relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two sides 
nevertheless share the common goal of avoiding direct confrontation 
and reducing the threat of nuclear war. The real challenge for 
American statecraft is how best to realize this commonality of 
interests, so as to preserve peace without jeopardizing our national 
security or abandoning our commitment to the cause of freedom and 
justice.5 
From the above statement with regard to the Soviet Union, it may be 
reasoned that President Reagan validated the requirement of a strong 
nuclear deterrent force for protecting the peace and ensuring the 
protection of the national interest of the United States. 
Further, it may be argued that President Reagan used the 1987 issue 
to attempt to gain Congressional and public support for strategic nuclear 
deterrence, which is predicated on the current nuclear Triad. President 
Reagan supported his rationale for the Triad as: 
In the interest of ensuring deterrence, the United States maintains 
diversified strategic forces to hedge against a disarming first 
strike, complicate Soviet attack plans, and guard against 
technological surprise which might threaten one element of our 
White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, January 
1987, p 4. For consistency between President Reagan's policies in 1987 
and 1988, see White House, National Security Strategy of the United 
States, January 1988, pp iv-v. In the Preface of the 1988 report, 
President Reagan stated the fundamentals of our strategy change little 
from year to year and the discussion in the 1988 report parallels the 1987 
report except changes to reflect significant developments. With regard to 
the Soviet Union, President Reagan acknowledged real changes would be 
welcomed, but as yet we had not seen any slackening of the growth of 
Soviet military power, or abandonment of expansionist aspirations. 
Therefore, since the 1987 and 1988 reports have a similar theme, this 
chapter will refer to the 1987 report when expressing the policies of the 
Reagan Administration. 
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strategic forces. To this end, we maintain a variety of basing 
modes, launch platforms, and attack vehicles, achieving diversity 
through a triad of SLBMs, ICBMs, and bombers. Adequate and 
survivable command and control is an essential element of strategic 
force structure, and is critical to the credibility of our strategic 
deterrent...Our strategic forces and the associated targeting policy 
must, by any calculation, be perceived as making nuclear warfare a 
totally unacceptable and unrewarding proposition for the Soviet 
leadership 6 
President Reagan's commitment to the strategic Triad was presented 
early in his first term. In 1981, President Reagan unveiled his strategic 
force modernization program.  The five elements of the modernization 
program were formally presented to Congress in the Report of Secretary of 
Defense Casper W. Weinberger in 1982.  Secretary Weinberger's report 
addressed the modernization of each leg of the Triad: 1) development and 
deployment of 100 B-1B bombers with initial operating capability in 1986 
and to continue work on an advanced technology bomber (ATB or "Stealth") 
for the 1990s; 2) development of a more accurate SLBM known as the D-5 or 
Trident II missile plus the continued construction of one Trident SSBN per 
year; and 3) step-by-step modernization of the ICBM force with the 
development and deployment of 100 MX missiles. Additionally, a report to 
Congress in 1983 on ICBM survivability was to address the research and 
development on three programs--deep basing, development of long-enduring 
aircraft that could carry and launch a MX missile, and a ballistic missile 
defense to protect our land-based missiles.7 
6Ibid., p 21. 
department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Casper W. 
Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1983 Budget, FY 1983-1987 Defense 
Programs, 8 February 1982. This report reflects the FY 1983 Defense 
Budget as of January 31, 1982. 
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C. COMMITMENT TO THE STRATEGIC TRIAD 
The commitment to maintain the strategic Triad has been continued 
into the Bush Administration and was readily endorsed during the 
transitional phase between the Reagan and Bush Administrations. In the 
January/February issue of Defense '89, Frank Carlucci as the outgoing 
Secretary of Defense maintained his support for the strategic nuclear 
Triad as being the robust deterrent against a Soviet attack in two ways. 
First, the Triad is an important hedge against a Soviet technology 
breakthrough that could threaten United States overall deterrent. 
Secondly, the combined effects of the three legs of the United States 
Triad complicates Soviet attack planning and its efforts to prevent 
retaliation.8 
Secretary Carlucci continued his emphasis on the existing Triad and 
continuous modernization of the components by expressing his view that the 
United States Triad must possess various characteristics and capabilities: 
...including survivability, prompt response, mission flexibility, 
adequate numbers and sufficient warhead accuracy and yield--to hold at 
risk those assets the Soviet leadership values most. No single weapon 
system incorporates all of these capabilities; hence, the importance of 
a proper strategic nuclear force mix...To fulfill its purpose, our 
strategic nuclear TRIAD must be modernized as required. We must 
continue to develop and deploy new systems that will ensure the 
credibility and effectiveness of our deterrent 9 
Since the transition of administrations in 1989, the Bush 
administration has conducted its own strategic review and has officially 
8Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, "America and the Defense 
Challenges Ahead", Defense  '89,  January/February 1989, p 4. 
9Ibid., p 4. 
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stated, "...the Administration strongly believes that continued strategic 
modernization is absolutely essential for our national security and that 
a fully modernized strategic TRIAD must provide the basis of all START 
force structure options."10 The same level of priority as been 
maintained by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in his Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress (January 1990). In his report, Secretary 
Cheney placed strategic nuclear modernization as one of the four 
priorities in developing the FY 1991 budget request. The report stressed 
that the capability, survivability, and endurance of our strategic nuclear 
forces and their associated command and control structure must be 
assured.11 
D. CONCLUSION 
With regard to the discussion of national security interest and the 
requirement for strategic nuclear forces, the guidance from both the Bush 
and Reagan Administrations has been clear. The United States will 
maintain a strong strategic nuclear force based on the strategic Triad. 
Although it is readily noticeable from the statements used to support this 
conclusion, there is a difference in the manner that the Soviets are 
projected. Of course, it must be realized that the difference in the 
world situation since early 1989 requires a modification in tone of 
"Department of Defense, Report to the Congress on the Analysis of 
Alternative Strategic Nuclear Force Postures for the United States Under 
a Potential START Treaty  (Unclassified Version), July 1989, p 2. 
"Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Annual 
Report to the President and the Congress,  January 1990, p 9. 
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declaratory guidance by the President and his leading advisors in the 
administration. There is the exception in the Bush Administration with 
respect to Secretary of Defense Cheney and his perspective of the Soviet 
Union. His opinion and the rationale for his beliefs will be discussed 
later in the chapter on assessing the threat. 
A central theme is that the difference in tone between the Reagan 
Administration in 1987 and the Bush Administration in 1990 may be a key 
indicator in determining how much emphasis and to what extent the 
strategic nuclear forces will play in the future as guarantors of United 
States national security. In the near future the Bush Administration may 
deduce that changes are going to be required; therefore, cooperation with 
the Congress is essential for developing the best strategy to support the 
national interest of the United States. The view of cooperation between 
the President and the Congress was expressed by President Bush's statement 
at the conclusion of National   Security Strategy  of  the  United States 
(March 1990): 
Under our Constitution, responsibility for national defense is shared 
between the executive and legislative branches of our federal 
government. The President, for example, is commander-in-chief, while 
Congress has the power to raise and support armies and declare war. This 
system of shared and separated powers is well designed to guard against 
abuses of power, but it works best in the demanding environment of 
national security affairs only if there is a spirit of cooperation 
between the two branches and, indeed, a strong measure of national and 
bipartisan consensus on basic policy...Congress and the President need, 
more than ever, to reflect that unity in their own cooperation. We owe 
the American people no less. 
12White House, National Security Strategy of the United States,  March 
1990, p 32. 
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The importance of cooperation between the Bush Administration and Congress 
will be vital as the discussion proceeds to assessing the current threat, 
the impact of a START Treaty, and the resultant strategic weapon delivery 
systems. Consequently, the goal of cooperation between the two government 
branches may be only obtainable through some changes in the United States 
strategic nuclear force structure. 
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III. STRATEGIC THREAT 
When discussing the United States nuclear force structure of the 
future, a determination of the potential strategic nuclear threat is 
essential.  Currently, and for the foreseeable future, the most 
significant threat to United States security interests remains the global 
challenge from the Soviet Union. This perception was reiterated by the 
Reagan Administration in the 1988 issue of National Security Strategy of 
the United States.•    Furthermore, the attitude of the past with regard 
to the Soviets may be readily ascertained from former Secretary of Defense 
Carlucci's statement: 
For America and other free nations in this interdependent world, the 
major potential threat to our way of life will continue to be the 
Soviet Union. The basis of that threat is Soviet military power, 
whose forces and deployments have enabled Moscow to gain influence 
over other nations by its potential to dominate them militarily. 
Recently, Soviet leaders have claimed that theirs is a defensive 
military doctrine and that they seek nothing more than a "reasonable 
sufficiency" of weapons...But at present there is no hard evidence 
that the evolution in the USSR has resulted in a different and less 
offensively oriented force structure or in any diminutive of 
resources going into the military...The prudent course is to gear our 
military posture to Soviet capabilities. 
The viewpoint of former Secretary Carlucci is extremely important in 
assessing the strategic threat of the Soviet Union. Of course, it must 
also be realized that his statement was made in early 1989, before the 
13White House, National   Security  Strategy   of   the   United   States, 
January 1988, p 5. 
uFrank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, p 3. 
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fall of the Berlin Wall and the deterioration of the Warsaw Pact. 
Therefore, a new strategic threat assessment of the Soviet Union will be 
required with the challenge being two-fold: first, realization that there 
is and will be a continued Soviet strategic nuclear threat; and secondly, 
the United States must acknowledge that changes have occurred which 
encourage the United States to work together with the Soviets to alleviate 
the tensions in the world and preserve peace. The issue of working 
together with the Soviets will undoubtedly have a dramatic impact on the 
future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Ultimately, the changes and reforms 
will affect the strategic nuclear force structure of the United States. 
The first area to be discussed will be based on the arguments that 
the Department of Defense have presented in describing the capabilities of 
the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces. The focal point of this 
argument will be Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and his opinions. 
The second area of discussion will be on the position that changes 
have taken place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which warrant a 
review of our strategic threat assessment. Any current and future 
assessment must focus on the policies that have been initiated by 
President Gorbachev. The guidelines for determining the United States 
response to the Soviet initiatives hinge on opinions and evaluations of 
how successful and irreversible the current Soviet policies may be in the 
future. Finally, the future alliance structure of NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact will be essential in determining the commitment of United States 
strategic nuclear weapons to the defense of Europe. 
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It is recognized as the decade of the 1990s begins that the potential 
threats to an international environment will increase. The threats from 
the Third World will most likely become greater, especially with regard to 
nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation. While new threats for the 
foreseeable future have been assessed as not possessing the capability to 
immediately endanger the existence of the United States in the near term, 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles may support 
SDI. Consequently, the only country with the potential to be a strategic 
threat to the United States will remain the Soviet Union and its strategic 
nuclear forces. Also, the strategic nuclear threat of the Soviet Union is 
considered the standard for determining the United States strategic 
nuclear forces of the United States. 
A. SOVIET CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT BY DOD 
The Department of Defense, as the agency responsible for the defense 
of the United States, is required to formulate a strategy to meet possible 
threats. The typical method of determining the threat by the Defense 
Department is by assessing the capabilities of potential threats. In the 
case of the strategic nuclear threat, the Soviet threat is of primary 
interest. The most current assessment of the Soviet Union's overall 
strategic nuclear capabilities has been expressed in the 1990 Joint 
Military Net Assessment (Unclassified Version) which states, "...the 
Soviet Union will remain the only nation capable of unilaterally 
inflicting vast nuclear destruction on the United States and its allies 
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through the 1990s."15 Most likely, that assessment was made with respect 
to the Soviet strategic nuclear forces being vast and varied with its 
arsenal of ICBMs, SLBMs, and Strategic Bombers. 
The vastness and variations of the Soviet Union's strategic forces 
may be derived from the Department of Defense's Soviet Military Power: 
Prospects for Change,1989. The 1989 issue provides operational data on 
eight different Soviet ICBMs as compared to three ICBMs for the United 
States; seven different Soviet SLBMs compared to two for the United 
States; and five Soviet intercontinental bombers as compared to three for 
the United States. Also, the Soviets are credited with multiple versions 
for three of their SLBMs.16 
A significant issue with DOD is the point that the Soviets' proclaim 
a nuclear war is unwinnable and strategic arms arsenals must be 
dismantled, yet they still continue deploying new generations of ICBMs, 
SLBMs, and Strategic Bombers.17  Specifically, DOD and Secretary of 
Defense Cheney have stressed that the Soviets have shown extraordinary 
momentum in the modernization and deployment of their offensive strategic 
nuclear forces such as: 
1. The silo-based SS-18 Mod 5 heavy ICBM with its capacity to carry 
at least ten nuclear warheads, while possessing greater accuracy and 
throw-weight, gives the Soviets the capability to destroy hard 
targets such as United States ICBM silos. 
"Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 Joint Military 
Net Assessment  (Unclassified Version), p ES-3. 
16Department of Defense, Soviet   Military   Power:    Prospects   for 
Change,1989,  pp 44-48. 
17Ibid., p 42. 
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2. The fifth-generation mobile ICBMs -- roughly 170 SS-25 road- 
mobile missiles and some 18 rail-mobile SS-24s (the latter having the 
capacity to carry ten warheads) -- enhances the survivability of the 
Soviet ICBM force. 
3. Within the last year, the Soviets have augmented their strategic 
ballistic missile submarine force by launching the sixth units of the 
Typhoon- and Delta IV-class submarines. Also the strategic manned 
bomber force continues to deploy new operational units of the Bear H 
and supersonic Blackjack bombers as launch platforms for their 3,000- 
kilometer-range, air-launched nuclear cruise missile. 
From the specifics provided on the strategic nuclear forces of the 
Soviet Union, it is logical to accept the position of the Department of 
Defense when assessing the strategic threat. The facts and figures do not 
represent a nation that is declaring itself to be defensive in nature as 
was previously pointed out by statements in early 1989 by Secretary 
Carlucci. Of course, a comprehensive evaluation of changes in the 
strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union will not accurately reflect 
the so-called new defensive strategy of the Soviets until approximately 
1994. The timeframe of approximately eight years is required for a weapon 
system to be developed and become operational. Consequently, 1994 will be 
significant in determining if the Soviets have discontinued their 
strategic nuclear force modernization program that was pursued during the 
1980s. 
With this in mind, it is believed that the DoD assessment of the 
Soviet Union's strategic nuclear force structure should continue to be the 
Ibid., Preface. Secretary Cheney has formally continued to 
emphasize in Congressional testimony and DoD publications the fact that 
the Soviets are modernizing their strategic nuclear forces. See 
Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 
January 1990, p 31. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1991 Budget: A 
Briefing by Dick Cheney Secretary of Defense,  p 3. 
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determining factor when projecting the requirements for the nuclear 
strategic forces of the United States. Nonetheless, the changes that have 
occurred in the Soviet Union cannot be completely disregarded. The 
changes and proposed reforms in policies may be an insight for permitting 
greater flexibility in the United States strategic force structure of the 
future. 
B. THE SOVIET UNION'S FUTURE WITH GORBACHEV'S REFORMS 
The paramount question in the minds of officials responsible for 
assessing the Soviet Union's future is whether the changes that have 
occurred and the proposed reforms will continue. The answer to this 
difficult question is strictly a matter of opinion. While there are 
varied opinions, most agree that the changes have made a lasting effect on 
the Soviet Union, and most assuredly the changes have resulted in 
irreversible events in Eastern Europe. Much of the debate on the issue 
centers on President Gorbachev and his future as the leader of the Soviet 
Union. 
Before discussing President Gorbachev and his reforms for the 
military, it is essential to establish why Mr. Gorbachev was required to 
propose military restructuring. At the heart of the Soviet problem is 
their economy.  In a 1988 speech by Robert Gates, Deputy Director of 
Central Intelligence, Mr. Gates stated: 
The selection of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary in the spring 
of 1985 signalled the Politburo's recognition that the Soviet Union 
was in deep trouble -- especially economically -- trouble that they 
recognized was affecting their military power and position in the 
world...There has been consistently strong support in the Politburo 
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since 1985 for modernization of the Soviet economy.  This remains 
Gorbachev's greatest political asset. 
The perceptions of Mr. Gates in 1988 provided an insight to the 
actual condition of the Soviet economy. As reported in the May 14, 1990 
issue of Newsweek, the CIA has maintained for the past decade that the 
Soviet Gross National Product (GNP) was about half of the United States' 
GNP, and Soviet military spending was about 16 percent of the total 
GNP.20 Even before the Newsweek article, the assessments by the CIA were 
disputed by two Soviet economist. 
The economists were Victor Belkin from the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
and Oleg T. Bogomolov who serves in the Congress of People's Deputies. 
First, Mr. Belkin said that the Soviet GNP was no more than 28 percent of 
the United States and may be even less. Secondly, Mr.Bogomolov stated 
that the Soviet military spending might account for 20 to 25 percent of 
the Soviet GNP as compared to the CIA estimate of 15 to 17 percent. Also, 
Mr. Bogomolov said "the economic situation in our country does not allow 
any alternative" to reducing military expenditures.21 
With these opinions of the Soviet economy, it becomes readily 
apparent that economic reform required changes politically and militarily. 
19Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, "Recent 
Developments in the Soviet Union and Implications for U.S. Security 
Policy", 14 October 1988, pp 2-3, Manuscript of speech presented to 
American Association for the Advancement of Science Colloquium on Science, 
Arms Control and National Security. 
20John Barry, "Failures of Intelligence?", Newsweek, 14 May 1990, pp 
20-21. 
21Robert Pear, "Soviet Experts Say Their Economy Is Worse Than U.S. 
Has Estimated", New York Times,  24 April 1990, p 6. 
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According to Michael MccGwire, Mr. Gorbachev realized in 1986 that Soviet 
economic reforms would fail without increasing democratization of the 
Soviet society, but the democratization could lead to a period of internal 
upheaval. Therefore, the requirement for stable relations with the United 
States and Western Europe became more essential. The stabilization of 
relations would make political sense and ultimately lead to renouncing the 
capacity to fight a world war.22 By renouncing the capacity to fight a 
world war and conducting unilateral cuts, the Soviets would be able to 
shift significant resources from defense to the civilian sector, and 
withdraw from the arms race, thereby denying the West the "Soviet 
threat".23 
Additionally, Michael MccGwire stated that the Soviets conducted 
debates to determine what was needed to ensure national security. The new 
doctrine developed and authorized was termed "defensive doctrine", which 
resulted in Mr. Gorbachev's statement at the United Nations in 1988 that 
the Soviet Union needed to move from an economy of armament to an economy 
of disarmament.24 From the description of events in 1987 and 1988, it 
seems logical to conclude the Soviet military reforms were not formulated 
with a desire for change, but the necessity to improve the economy of the 
Soviet Union. 
22Michael MccGwire, "About Face: How the Soviets Stopped Planning for 
World War", Technology Review,  Nov/Dec 1989, p 39. 
^Ibid., p 39. 
24Ibid., p 39. 
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If the reforms of the military are for real, it becomes evident that 
philosophical attitudes toward war, especially nuclear war, required 
alteration by the Soviet Union. The essence of the philosophical change 
was expressed in a statement presented on May 10,1989 before the Defense 
Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 
by Andrey A. Kokoshin, Deputy Director, Institute for the U.S.A. and 
Canada, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Moscow.  Mr. Kokoshin's 
statement clearly stated that the Soviet Union was engaged in modification 
of military policy: 
We really now have entered the phase of very substantial modification 
of our military policy along the lines of the whole course of 
perestroika in the Soviet Union, and we believe that a country which 
started the profound economic and political reform cannot avoid also 
reforms in the military sphere, and this is a major source of a new 
approach to the military thinking in the Soviet Union to our military 
strategy and tactics. 
Additionally, Mr. Kokoshin's statement suggested as early as 1982 the 
Soviets had unilaterally undertaken a non-first-use commitment to nuclear 
strategy. This important change was initiated in the second half of the 
1980s as the Soviet military and political thinking, including those at 
25House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, "Gorbachev's 
Force Reductions and the Restructuring of Soviet Forces" [H.A.S.C. No.101- 
3], 10 and 14 March 1989, p 3. The statement of Mr. Kokoshin seems highly 
relevant because he is a Soviet academic expressing his view on Soviet 
military policy. Capt. Bill Manthorpe (USN, Ret.) has noted in a working 
paper in 1989 on "Stability vs Deterrence" that the new Soviet views on 
military thinking have been formulated for the Soviet leadership by 
civilian academics. Capt. Manthorpe suggests that the Soviet academics as 
principal advisors, the Soviets have begun to think about the threat and 
re-calculating the correlation. This has led to the new thinking with 
regard to nuclear war. 
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the highest political and military level, made clear the following 
fundamental notions: 
First, a nuclear war cannot be a continuation of politics; it cannot 
serve as a means for solving political problems... Second, there can 
be no victory in a nuclear war. There can be no victors in such a 
war. Such a war will result not only in the annihilation of those 
directly involved in the conflict, but it can annihilate the whole 
mankind. 
Mr. Kokoshin's statement before the House Armed Services Committee 
with regard to nuclear war appears to have been an extension of the 
thinking in Mr. Gorbachev's book Perestroika.    In the introduction to the 
reader, Mr. Gorbachev describes that in a world with nuclear missiles, 
there is a requirement for normal international conditions to prevent the 
outbreak of a world war, even if unsanctioned or accidental.  When 
specifically referring to nuclear war, Mr. Gorbachev states: 
Everyone seems to agree that there would be neither winners nor 
losers in such a war. There would be no survivors. It is a mortal 
threat for all...Although the prospect of death in a nuclear war is 
undoubtedly the most appalling scenario possible, the issue is 
broader than that. The spiraling arms race, coupled with the 
military and political realities of the world and the persistent 
traditions of pre-nuclear political thinking, impedes cooperation 
between countries and peoples, which--East and West agree--is 
indispensable if the world's nations want to preserve nature intact, 
26House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, 10 and 14 March 
1989, p 4. In addition to Mr. Kokoshin's statement, Capt. Manthorpe's 
working paper in 1989 on "Stability and Deterrence" explained that the 
Soviet civilian academics concluded and convinced President Gorbachev 
that: Because of the huge arsenals of nuclear weapons, the chance of 
either side initiating premeditated nuclear war was unlikely. By 
accepting this conclusion, Capt. Manthorpe believes that basically the 
Soviet civilian advisors have accepted MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) 
and consider that mutual deterrence exists at the nuclear level. Further, 
Capt Manthorpe asserted that the Soviet civilian advisors accepted the 
possibility of mutual nuclear deterrence existing at lower balanced force 
levels; therefore, START. 
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to ensure the rational use and reproduction of her resources and, 
consequently, to survive as befits human beings. 
While the previous discussions on the severe economic conditions 
have, most likely, been the catalyst to the Soviet changes, it must be 
remembered when the reforms were initiated. The obvious answer lies with 
Mr. Gorbachev assuming the leadership role of the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, the current analysis of the future of the Soviet Union has been 
centered on whether Mr. Gorbachev succeeds or fails. This statement needs 
no more support than the actions of President Bush regarding the situation 
in Lithuania. 
Recently President Bush, after conferring with allies and 
Congressional leaders on the situation in Lithuania, decided to delay 
implementing sanctions against the Soviet Union. The reason for the delay 
given by one senior official was that President Bush "...looks at what 
Gorbachev has accomplished in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe in 
particular, and there are huge equities at stake here".28 Marl in 
Fitzwater, President Bush's spokesman, added the delay of sanctions was 
taken because the Soviets had shown 'flexibility' in recent statements 
regarding Lithuania, and that President Bush did not want to interfere 
with arms control talks or the schedule for the next Soviet-American 
summit. Additionally, President Bush stated that his inaction was 
motivated by fear of provoking the Soviet Union at a tense moment: 
27Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the 
Uorld  (New York, NY: Harper & Row,Publishers, 1988), pp xiii-xiv. 
28Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Delays Action on Lithuania, Not Wanting to 
Harm Gorbachev", New York Times,  25 April 1990, p 1. 
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I may do something imprudent...I am concerned that we not do anything 
that would cause the Soviet Union to take action that would set back 
the cause of freedom. 
The actions or inactions of the Bush administration with regard to 
Lithuania reflect a perception of trying to not provoke Soviet action, but 
maybe more importantly represent a policy of not creating an additional 
crisis for Mr. Gorbachev. Also, it must be remembered that President Bush 
advocated in the 1990 edition of the "National Security Strategy of the 
United States" a policy of working together with the Soviet Union. If a 
goal of the United States is to work together with the Soviet Union, it 
appears that a policy of encouraging the success of Mr. Gorbachev is in 
the best interest of the United States. 
Because the United States cannot develop a threat assessment of the 
Soviet Union on the success of Mr. Gorbachev, any assessment must address 
the likelihood of Mr. Gorbachev's success. Also, if he does fail, what is 
the likelihood of the Soviets returning to their previous emphasis on 
military power? The first issue of Mr. Gorbachev succeeding apparently 
was enhanced when the Supreme Soviet, after a heated debate, approved a 
bill for the creation of the presidency in principle on February 27, 1990. 
Mr. Gorbachev and his supporters had argued that a strong executive was 
needed to pull the Soviet Union from its economic and political 
paralysis.30 
^Ibid., p 1. 
30Susanne Sternthal, "Gorbachev's Executive Power Play", Insight,  9 
April 1990, p 34. 
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The underlying motive of establishing a strong presidency may have 
been the desire of Mr. Gorbachev to switch his power base from the 
Communist Party to the state and thereby to diminish the role of the 
party.31 The action of decreasing the power of the Communist party was 
accomplished by deleting Article 6 (guaranteed the Communist Party 
monopoly of power) from the Soviet Constitution and abolishing the 
Politburo. The Politburo's replacement was the Presidential Council, 
which resembles a Cabinet.32 From these recent changes, a logical 
assessment would be that President Gorbachev is firmly in control of the 
Soviet Union. 
Without a doubt, the constitutional changes in the Soviet Party 
Plenum during February 1990 were historical as well as indicating support 
for Mr. Gorbachev's individual power. Also, it must be realized that Mr. 
Gorbachev accomplished increasing the power of the presidency during a 
period of overall uncertainty and instability in the Soviet Union. For a 
recent assessment of Gorbachev's future and uncertainty in the Soviet 
Union, William Webster, Director of Central Intelligence, addressed the 
House Armed Services Committee on March 1, 1990. Mr. Webster's assessment 
was: 
In the Soviet Union, a major reversal of President Gorbachev's 
policies could only come with his removal. This does not seem likely 
now. In fact, the Party Plenum early last month strengthened his 
position, while also advancing the reform process and signalling the 
end of the Communists' monopoly of power...Nevertheless, the long- 
term outlook for the present leadership, and for the Soviet Union 
31Ibid., p 35. 
32Ibid., p 35. 
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itself, is uncertain. Ethnic and other tensions will persist as 
reform leaders and an increasingly mobilized population deal with 
dilemmas that have no precedents. Instability will be fueled by 
serious and still mounting economic problems. 
After reviewing the reforms of Mr. Gorbachev, the question of 
determining the Soviet threat cannot be readily answered.  The one 
argument that does seem prominent though is the Soviet Union is in a state 
of uncertainty and turmoil.  These conditions will certainly have an 
ultimate effect on the future of the Soviet Union. The presence of these 
conditions with regard to the Soviet Union was expressed by former 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle's prepared statement before 
the Senate European Affairs Subcommittee. Mr. Perle stated that caution 
should be exercised as a result of the instability created by Moscow's 
loosening the grip: 
...not only in Eastern Europe, but in the Soviet Union itself, and 
the uncertainty about the future Soviet leadership...Mr. Gorbachev 
has set in motion centrifugal forces that have reawakened old ethnic 
and national allegiances. In Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Moldavia, and elsewhere there are hapless, restive people 
who have suffered under Soviet imperial domination...No one can say 
where this will lead. But an unstable Soviet empire could be a 
dangerous place.34 
As far as assessing the strategic threat of the Soviet Union, the 
changes and reforms of Mr. Gorbachev's leadership are far reaching. A 
significant change has been the reliance of Mr. Gorbachev on the Soviet 
civilian advisors for his policy of a new military thinking. From this 
33William Webster, Director of Central Intelligence, "Statement of the 
Director of Central Intelligence Before the Armed Services Committee, 
House of Representatives", 1 March 1990, p 3. 
wRichard Perle, "Statement before the European Affairs Subcommittee, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate", 7 March 1990, p 3. 
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new military thinking, the acceptance of nuclear war being unwinnable has 
evolved. It would be unadvisable to assume that this change in thinking 
was not supported by other issues. These issues are undoubtedly centered 
on the Soviet economy and the domestic turmoil in the Soviet Union. 
From this overview of the current Soviet situation, the likelihood of 
a Soviet Strategic nuclear attack appears to have decreased dramatically. 
In a prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 
January 24, 1990, Mr. Perle (traditionally a pro-defense expert) 
summarized his thoughts on the possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack as: 
There is a second, canonical threat that seems to me much diminished. 
That is the threat of a massive Soviet nuclear strike, out of the 
blue, against the strategic retaliatory forces of the United States, 
a strike that would entail thousands of nuclear weapons exploding on 
American territory. I believe that Soviet attitudes toward nuclear 
weapons have been evolving, by and large away from the contemplation 
of a massive disarming strike. The days when Soviet doctrine 
considered that nuclear weapons differed little except in explosive 
power from conventional ones, are past. For the foreseeable future 
I believe we can safely reduce investment we make in protecting 
against a massive surprise Soviet nuclear attack.35 
It is believed that Mr. Perle's assessment of the current thinking in the 
Soviet Union will be instrumental in determining the future strategic 
nuclear forces of the United States. 
C. NATO AND WARSAW PACT 
Currently, the discussion of the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
is focused on the events in Germany. This attention is warranted in part 
35Richard Perle, "Statement Before the Committee on Armed Services, 
United States Senate", 24 January 1990, p 3. The same assessment was 
presented by Mr. Perle's statement on March 7, 1990 before the Senate 
European Affairs Subcommittee. See previous footnote for source. 
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because the unification of Germany and the resulting security structure 
will have an impact on the strategic force structure of the United States. 
Of course, the opinions are varied with regard to the future security 
structures in Europe, as new developments are reported daily.  For the 
United States, the issues pertaining to the strategic threat are the 
future of nuclear weapons in NATO with a unified Germany, and the 
requirement for United States strategic nuclear forces with regard to 
Warsaw Pact military targets. 
As German unification talks commence with regard to NATO, the issue 
of nuclear weapons has emerged as a main concern.  In what may be 
considered a response to this concern, President Bush announced the 
cancellation of some newer battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe and 
called for a NATO summit to rewrite political and military strategy. 
President Bush stated: 
As democracy comes to Eastern Europe and Soviet troops return home, 
there is less need for nuclear systems of the shortest range...The 
revolutionary changes transforming Europe are moving us from the 
postwar era to a new era in history beyond containment (of Warsaw 
Pact forces).36 
As President Bush was announcing the cancellation of plans to modernize 
nuclear artillery and Lance missile capabilities for Europe, NATO 
Secretary-General Manfred Woerner, while not endorsing an entirely de- 
nuclearized Germany, was reassuring the Soviet Union that a unified 
Germany in NATO would not pose a threat to the Soviets. Mr. Woerner 
stated: 
36
. . .,"Bush Scraps European Arms Plan", The   Monterey   Herald 
(Associated Press), 4 May 1990, p 1. 
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We have no intention of shifting the military balance in Europe to 
the detriment of the Soviet Union...We want to take into account the 
legitimate security of the Soviet Union...Our mission is clear. This 
is not a game of winning or losing: At the end, there will only be 
winners. The Soviet Union will not lose. It will gain -- in 
stability and security. 
Since announcing the cancellation of battlefield nuclear weapons, 
the nuclear weapon issue in NATO has progressed to a point where the Dutch 
and West German defense ministers have urged the United States and other 
allies to remove nuclear artillery out of Europe.  Additionally, Dutch 
Ambassador to NATO Adrian Jacobovits stated, " We think we can do away 
with nuclear artillery and we can do it unilaterally."38 At the same 
time as many Europeans are calling for bans on nuclear weapons, Senator 
Joseph Biden, chairman of a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on 
European Affairs, has suggested that a NATO review should begin with the 
theory of defending Western Europe with conventional forces and stated, " 
I believe the military mission nuclear weapons previously served in NATO 
strategy has become obsolete."39 
The significance of the nuclear weapons issue is that if NATO comes 
to believe that battlefield nuclear weapons are no longer needed, then the 
theory of a progressive escalation to strategic nuclear war may be in 
question. In contrast, President Bush has maintained that nuclear weapons 
37William Tuohy, "Soviets Reassured by NATO", The Monterey Herald (Los 
Angeles Times Service), 4 May 1990, p 1 
M
. . .."NATO Allies Seek Nucle. 
(Associated Press), 10 May 1990, p 1. 
ar Weapon Ban", The Monterey Herald 
39Ibid. 
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should be retained in theater by NATO.40 This position may require 
modification if the United States wants to ensure its ultimate goal of a 
unified Germany being a part of NATO. The difficult issue is that the 
Soviets require reassurances about security and desire to ensure their own 
place in the new Europe. 
East German Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann has stated, "If NATO 
changes its structure and command [system], Gorbachev could accept a 
united Germany within NATO."*1 Mr. Eppelmann has provided a list of 
changes that may be required, of which one is the reduction of NATO's 
nuclear arsenal.42 As the debate on nuclear weapons in NATO becomes more 
intense, the issue of the requirement for the United States strategic 
forces in support of NATO will arise. This requirement will be determined 
from assessing the future threat of the Warsaw Pact as a fighting unit. 
With the changes toward democracy that have occurred in Eastern 
Europe, the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact threat to NATO has been significantly 
reduced.  The reduction of this threat was recently expressed by Mr. 
Webster in an assessment of Eastern Europe. Mr. Webster stated: 
As a result of the changes in Eastern Europe, and Soviet actions 
since President Gorbachev's speech at the United Nations in December 
1988, the Warsaw Pact threat to the United States and its NATO allies 
40Russell Watson, "Losing Out in Europe?", Newsweek,  14 May 1990, pp 
26-27. 
41Ibid., p 27. 
42Ibid., p 27. 
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has been significantly reduced...Soviet military planners could not 
count on Eastern European military forces in a conflict with NATO. 
Since Mr. Webster's assessment, Defense Secretary Cheney has 
announced that a review by strategists of the number and type of targets 
to be attacked in nuclear war was underway. Mr. Cheney stated: 
To the extent that you used to be concerned about targeting military 
targets in the Warsaw Pact, and the old Warsaw Pact goes away, you've 
got new requirements. 
These acknowledgements of the changes in the Warsaw Pact will certainly 
affect the requirements of the strategic nuclear forces of the United 
States. 
With regard to the Warsaw Pact and NATO alliances, the strategic 
threat of the Warsaw Pact has diminished, and the support for nuclear 
weapons in NATO has begun to be debated vigorously. As far as the United 
States and its determination of the strategic threat is concerned, the end 
result will continue to be that the United States strategic forces are 
considered the last resort for NATO. As the deterioration in the Warsaw 
Pact continues, the requirement in numbers of United States strategic 
nuclear weapons needed for Warsaw Pact targets will in all likelihood be 
decreased. 
William Webster, Director of Central Intelligence, "Statement of the 
Director of Central Intelligence Before the Armed Services Committee, 
House of Representatives", 1 March 1990, p 7. 
uMichael R. Gordon, "Cheney Proposes Sharp Reductions in New 
Warplanes", New York Times,  27 April 1990, p 10. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
In evaluating the strategic threat, the focus of this chapter has 
centered on the actual strategic nuclear weapon capabilities of the Soviet 
Union, and the reforms of Mr. Gorbachev. These two areas have proven to 
indicate a strategic threat remains with regard to the Soviet Union, 
although the likelihood of a strategic nuclear war has diminished. 
Therefore, the threat determination of the future must incorporate both 
issues. The United States is no longer in the position of planning to 
execute a strategy based on the old worst case assumptions, if the 
assessment does not support a worst case scenario. 
With respect to the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces, the 
capabilities assessment supports the philosophy that the Soviets retain 
the capability to destroy the United States with nuclear weapons. The 
capabilities are vast and varied with ICBMs, SLBMs, and Strategic Bombers. 
The Soviets have shown their intention to maintain these weapon systems 
through modernization. Although if the Soviet economy continues on its 
current path of self-destruction, the strategic modernization program may 
begin to suffer. 
As indicated in this review, the Soviet Union's economy appears much 
worse than previously forecasted. Therefore, major reform programs were 
initiated by Mr. Gorbachev to improve the economic situation of the Soviet 
Union. To accomplish a new economic plan, the Soviet leadership was 
required to alter military and political thinking. The results have led 
to an acceptance of policy that nuclear war is unwinnable, and the best 
interest of the Soviet Union would be served by cooperating with the 
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United States and the Western countries. This plan has appeared to have 
merit rhetorically, but the economic and ethnic problems that exist have 
only indicated a state of turmoil and instability in the Soviet Union. 
Consequently, the real question is whether the reforms of Mr. Gorbachev 
are reversible. 
Additionally, the issue of NATO and the Warsaw Pact must be 
considered in assessing the strategic threat. It seems apparent that NATO 
will be maintained as an alliance and a unified Germany will be a member. 
The German membership will only occur when the Soviet Union is assured of 
its security, which likely will require removal of most nuclear weapons 
from Europe. The removal of nuclear weapons will require the United 
States strategic nuclear forces to play a greater role in European 
security. However, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact will lessen the 
target requirements of the United States strategic forces. 
With these issues in mind, the United States assessment of the 
strategic threat will require the United States to maintain a strong 
strategic nuclear force structure. At this time it appears logical to 
presume the likelihood of a strategic nuclear strike by the Soviets seems 
to be decreasing; therefore, the United States may be afforded the 
opportunity to examine revised strategic nuclear force structures. 
Nonetheless, it must be remembered that the ever-present capabilities of 
the Soviet Union does not allow irrational thinking with regard to the 
future strategic nuclear forces of the United States. 
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In my opinion, the correct philosophy for assessing the strategic 
threat the future comes from an interview of Secretary of Defense Cheney 
on "Face the Nation". Secretary Cheney stated: 
The fact of the matter is that intentions can change overnight. What 
we have to deal with in the Defense Department are capabilities. And 
Soviet capabilities that are available today to Mr. Gorbachev, who 
may in fact have pursued a far more friendly posture toward the West, 
are still going to be there for his successor...And we have to deal 
with Soviet military capabilities, not just intentions. 
Secretary Cheney's comments are essential in determining the United States 
strategic forces for the future, although current and future events must 
not be overlooked as an opportunity to explore new options for the future. 
45
... "Interview with Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense", "CBS 
NEWS xFace the Nation'" (News Transcripts, Inc.), 4 February 1990, p 3 
(transcript). 
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IV. ARMS CONTROL AND THE START TREATY 
As the United States begins a new assessment of international 
requirements for the 1990s and the 21st century, arms control has become 
a topic of major discussion. Arms control provides options for the 
reduction of weapons while maintaining stability. The arguments for arms 
control have become varied, but for this review the basic guidelines of 
discussion will be President Bush's 1990 report on the National Security 
Strategy of the United States, Secretary of Defense Cheney's Annual Report 
to the President and the Congress (January 1990), and the United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Annual Report to Congress,1989. The 
guidance of these reports provides the overall strategy of the United 
States with regard to arms control negotiation. 
Currently, with respect to strategic nuclear forces of the United 
States and Soviet Union, the ongoing negotiations are the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks (START) Treaty. The impact of signing and ratifying a 
START Treaty will definitely affect the United States strategic force 
structure of the future. Therefore, the negotiating position of the 
United States must reflect a strategy that favors the strengths of United 
States' weapon systems technology. 
Subsequently, the United States negotiating position should focus on 
a combination of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces. This 
combination will allow the United States to negotiate with two priorities: 
first, the reduction of the Soviet Heavy ICBM force in a START Treaty; and 
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secondly, the defensive potential of the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI). These two positions could lead to further negotiations which may 
result in a consensus that ICBMs should be banned in the interest of both 
the United States and Soviet Union. Although it is recognized that a 
bilateral agreement will not completely prevent the proliferation of 
ballistic missiles, an agreement between the United States and the Soviet 
Union would have an influence on the issue of ballistic missiles. 
Presently and for the near future, it would benefit the national 
security of the United States to support a strategy of limiting ICBMs and 
continuing the development of SDI to protect the United States and our 
allies from the increased threat of ballistic missile proliferation. By 
negotiating for reduction of ICBMs, the United States would be lowering 
the most significant threat of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. 
Furthermore, the advancement of SDI would provide additional support 
against a Soviet ICBM and SLBM attack, as well as diminish an increasing 
threat from nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation in Third World 
countries. At the same time, the Soviets may realize these proposals 
enhance their security against an increasing threat of proliferation in 
the Third World. 
The following discussion on arms control will concentrate on the 
previously mentioned topics and in particular, the current negotiations of 
the START Treaty. It must be remembered that the signing and ratification 
of a START Treaty will ultimately lead to a modification of the United 
States nuclear force structure. With this in mind, the United States' 
arms control negotiations should be focused on the improvement of 
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stability which is a direct result of negotiating from a position of 
strength. The theory of negotiating from strength is not a new concept 
and has been credited by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger as 
the method of negotiation which led to the signing of the INF Treaty. 
In his book Fighting for Peace,  Mr. Weinberger states: 
There is not a better example of the importance of negotiating from 
strength than the INF Treaty...The INF Treaty shows that the Reagan 
Administration policies were correct. It shows negotiations from 
strength, works. It shows that by sticking with a negotiating 
position, by refusing to be intimidated by Soviet walkouts, and by 
not permitting America's goals to be linked to Soviet demands that 
weaken our strategic defense we can successfully achieve our security 
goals in a negotiation... Verifiable agreements reducing armaments 
are an integral part of national security, but they are not an end in 
themselves. That should be self-evident; but it is often overlooked 
in the pressures of summitry, politics and the desire to achieve 
results. 
Although full agreement on the success of the INF Treaty may be 
questioned, the important point is that a conviction was made to negotiate 
from a position of strength and not let the Soviet Union dictate the 
United States negotiating position.  This attitude must be maintained 
throughout the START negotiations because the United States' strategic 
nuclear force structure of the future will be determined by a START 
Treaty. 
A. GUIDANCE FOR ARMS CONTROL 
The guidance for arms control is influenced by several agencies of 
the executive branch. The prevailing theme for arms control in the Bush 
Administration was expressed in the 1990 report on National   Security 
^Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in 
the Pentagon  (New York, NY: Warner Books, Inc., 1990), pp 332-333. 
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Strategy of the United States by stating, "Arms control is a means, not an 
end; it is an important component of a broader policy to enhance national 
security."47  This philosophy is extremely important to DoD for the 
development of defense policy and future weapon systems. 
In the 1990 report to the President and Congress, OSD (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense) elaborated on the statement in President Bush's 
report with regard to arms control by stating: 
The United States engages in arms control as part of a coordinated 
effort to enhance security -- not as an end unto itself. Through 
arms reduction agreements, the United States seeks to reduce military 
threats to U.S. and allied interests, inject greater predictability 
into military relationships, and channel force postures in more 
stabilizing directions. Such agreements must place a premium on the 
detection of significant noncompliance and preserve the latitude to 
conduct an effective political, economic, or military 
response...Verification is an essential element of the arms control 
process. 
Of course, the OSD statement does imply an attitude of skepticism with 
regard to compliance. 
47White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, (March 
1990), p 15. 
^Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Annual 
Report to the President and Congress, January 1990, p 3. Also see 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, "U.S. Strategic 
Forces and START", "Hearings before the Defense Policy Panel of the 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives" [H.A.S.C. No. 100- 
98], 16 and 17 May 1988, p 1. The opening statement of former Secretary 
of Defense James R. Schlesinger before the Defense Policy Panel in 1988 
reflect some of the basic thoughts that Secretary of Defense Cheney's 
report in 1990 advocates. Additionally, Mr. Schlesinger states,"the 
purpose of arms control is not merely to achieve reductions. One has to 
think through other aspects of any arms control range, its impact on 
strategic stability, its impact on the overall defense posture of the 
alliance—which goes beyond strategic stability—and also, on its 
political impact." 
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With respect to arms control agreements, the emphasis on compliance 
is warranted and should not be taken lightly. It 1s a recognized belief 
that arms control is only as effective as the participants' Intention to 
comply with the terms of an agreement. When noncompliance is allowed or 
not detected, an arms control agreement has failed and the possibility of 
an aggressor gaining an advantage becomes a major threat. According to 
Dr. Kerry Kartchner, the United States must not forget that past history 
of compliance indicates an underlying philosophy of the intent by some 
governments of noncompliance with an agreement at the time of signing.49 
The latest report of possible noncompliance relates to the INF Treaty 
and focuses on two issues: first, the discovery of SS-23 missiles in East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria; and second, the dispute over on-site 
inspection of a former SS-20 missile factory. The first issue is of 
significance because the INF negotiators had specifically requested and 
been given assurances that no INF missiles had been transferred to Warsaw 
Pact allies by the Soviet Union. The second issue is centered on the 
Soviets' refusal to permit the use of X-ray equipment to monitor missile 
canisters leaving a former SS-20 factory in Votkinsk.  The underlying 
*
9Kerry M. Kartchner, "Soviet Compliance with a START Agreement: 
Prospects under Gorbachev", Strategic Review, Fall 1989, p 49. Dr. 
Kartchner uses two Soviet examples to amplify his point of signing an 
agreement with the intention of not complying. First, he advocates the 
1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as an example of a treaty that the Soviets 
intended to violate as soon as the major reason for signing the treaty 
passed (fledgling Bolshevik regime's imminent collapse). Secondly, he 
cites the Soviets stated the intent of noncompliance at the outset of SALT 
if the NATO nations deployed strategic ballistic missile submarines 
additional to the number that existed at the time SALT I Agreements were 
signed. 
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concern with the second issue is the violation of the letter and spirit of 
the INF Treaty's verification regime.50  The prospect of Soviet 
violations of verification on the INF Treaty should create a sense of 
skepticism on the part of the United States negotiators with regard to the 
detailed verification procedures that will be required for START. 
Therefore, the real issue for the United States is determining the 
appropriate policy for responding to violations of noncompliance as arms 
control becomes more complicated. 
Remember, the issue of noncompliance is a risk that must be 
understood when an arms control agreement is negotiated.  These risks 
should be calculated and negotiations conducted with a strategy of 
minimizing risks to the national security of the United States. President 
Bush stated his guidance for compliance with arms control in his February 
27, 1990, report to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control 
agreements. President Bush specified: 
Without exception, the United States expects meticulous fulfillment 
of all existing and future arms control agreements and all 
obligations that they entail. Otherwise, the arms control process 
cannot benefit U.S. national security, nor can treaties be ratified. 
I am committed to ensuring that there is scrupulous compliance with 
all arms control agreements and related undertakings. We cannot and 
will not accept any lesser standard. Put simply, arms control 
commitments must be precisely defined and scrupulously observed. 
Nothing less will do...My Administration is committed to the pursuit 
of new arms control agreements that reduce the threat of the outbreak 
of war and contribute to international stability...However, they will 
50Bill Gertz, "Discovery of Soviet Missiles Sidetracks Arms-Control 
Efforts", Washington Times,  2 April 1990, p 3. 
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be achieved only if effective verification and total compliance are 
integral elements of the process.51 
At this time it seems unavoidable that President Bush's guidance, if 
precisely defined and scrupulously observed, will be challenged if a START 
Treaty [even if only in principle] is to be signed at the May 1990 Summit 
in Washington. 
Although reservations may exist for arms control agreements, the 
international environment of today requires the United States to pursue 
arms control initiatives. This position was clearly stated in a report on 
May 24,1988, by the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee in Armed 
Services, House of Representatives. The report stated: 
One important factor in determining whether U.S. forces are 
survivable and effective, of course, is the size of Soviet forces. 
If there are no limits—that is, no arms control agreement--the 
potential size of the problem would be unlimited. 
With this in mind, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) position for negotiating arms control is to take advantage of 
favorable changes in the international arena, but with the realization 
that negotiations must be conducted with prudence. 
In the 1989 annual report to Congress, ACDA states: 
While arms control seeks to manage the process of international 
reductions of arms in the context of improved stability and 
predictability, there is always the possibility that political 
White House, Administration's Report to the Congress on Soviet 
Honcompliance with Arms Control Agreements (Unclassified Version)", 27 
February 1990, pi. 
"Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, "Breakout, 
Verification and Force Structure: Dealing with the Full Implications of 
START", Report of the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives,  p 9. 
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reforms may be reversed or that the internal processes of individual 
nations may outstrip international efforts to reach agreements. 
Therefore, it behooves the United States to maintain a prudent course 
aimed at securing lasting agreements that truly enhance national 
security. 
As the United States moves forward in arms control agreements, the 
overriding objective is to maintain the national security of the United 
States while reducing the number of weapons and weapon systems. 
In planning for reduction of weapon systems through arms control 
negotiations, the currently volatile issue of economic savings or benefits 
will undoubtedly arise. It must be made clear that economic benefits will 
be a possible result of arms control, not the reason for the initiation of 
arms control reductions. Mr. Barry Blechman, former assistant director of 
ACDA from 1977 to 1980, states: 
The potential value of conceivable arms control agreements is not 
sufficient to make economics a significant determinant of arms 
control policy. Arms control issues should be evaluated strictly in 
terms of their security and political implications. They should not 
be viewed as a potential means of economic -salvation. If defense 
savings are necessary for fiscal reasons, they should be achieved 
through institutional and procedural reforms required to use defense 
resources more efficiently. For both the United States and the 
Soviet Union, further reductions in the economic burden of military 
"United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Annual Report to Congress, 1989, pp 
2-3. Also see Edward L. Rowny, "Arms Control at Arm's Length", US Naval 
Institute Proceedings, May 1990, p 54. Mr. Rowny, Special Adviser to the 
President and Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters, expresses in 
his article that simply, it is U.S. policy that our arms control 
agreements shall be equitable, verifiable, and must accomplish the 
following: 1) enhance the national security of the United States and its 
allies; 2) reduce the risk of war; and 3) strengthen global stability. It 
is noted by Mr. Rowny that this policy was presented before to the Joint 
Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committee by ACDA. 
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expenditures are more likelv to come from unilateral decisions than 
from negotiated agreements. 
With Mr. Belchman's statement in mind, it is believed that 
negotiations should be of primary benefit to the United States security 
posture, but also be economically beneficial whenever possible. This 
philosophy requires negotiations to protect areas the United States has 
already invested in developing and not to initiate new, unfunded programs 
unless national security will be enhanced. Additionally, it is essential 
to understand that arms control should not be conducted for purely 
budgetary reasons, especially if technological advances would be 
sacrificed. 
The end result is that the United States strategy for arms control 
should focus on the areas of technological advantage to the United States. 
With the conclusion of a START Treaty, the United States strategic force 
structure must reflect weapon systems that are technologically 
advantageous to the United States, not a force structure based on 
advantage to the Soviet Union. In the following discussion of the START 
Treaty, the position of the United States and the Soviet Union will be 
reviewed and individual issues assessed on the possible impact of the 
United States strategic nuclear forces for the future. 
54Barry M. Blechman, "A $100 Billion Understanding", SAIS Review: A 
Journal of International Affairs, Summer-Fall 1989, p 89-90. For a 
further understanding of Mr. Blechman's statement of not negotiating arms 
control for potential economic benefits, see entire article pp 73-99. 
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B. START TREATY 
When discussing the realities of a START Treaty, it is evident that 
the ultimate outcome will be a restructured strategic nuclear force for 
both the United States and the Soviet Union. In early 1989, the Bush 
Administration recognized a START agreement and the results on the 
strategic nuclear forces must be in agreement with Congress, especially 
the Senate, to ensure ratification; therefore, a complete strategic arms 
review was initiated before talks on a START Treaty were to be continued. 
Secretary Baker stressed the importance of the strategic arms review as a 
means to ensure that an agreement negotiated with the Soviet Union could 
be ratified by the Senate. At the same time, Secretary Baker acknowledged 
that there were reservations in the Bush Administration on the present 
direction of the agreement and the possibility of the agreement actually 
being ratified by the Senate.55 
With this in mind, the negotiations on a START Treaty under the 
guidance of the Bush Administration was delayed until June 19, 1989. At 
that time, the Bush Administration made its proposals for START which call 
for: 
...deep reductions in strategic nuclear forces aimed at creating a 
more stable nuclear balance and reducing the risk of war.  The 
55Don Oberdorfer and Robert J. McCartney, "Baker Voices Concern Over 
START Pact", Washington Post, 13 February 1989, pi. At the time of this 
article, Secretary Baker was on his first overseas trip as Secretary of 
State. The article also quoted an earlier testimony before Congress by 
Secretary Baker on the Bush Administration's desire to "...build on the 
progress that has been made to date in the START negotiations. But we do 
want to take sufficient time to do it right, so that if we accomplish a 
treaty, we can bring back a treaty that we can get ratified here in the 
Senate." 
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reductions are designed to support the U.S. goal of strengthened 
deterrence bv- reducing the capability to launch a first strike, even 
in a crisis. 
This proposal does not differ from the basic strategy that was formulated 
in 1982. According to Max M. Kampelman, a former head of the Nuclear and 
Space Talks in Geneva, the negotiating position of the United States has 
been: 
Form the outset of a START negotiations in 1982, the U.S. objective 
has been to promote stability through deep reductions primarily in 
those strategic capabilities that pose the greatest threat to 
stability--namely, fast-flying (and consequently short warning) 
ballistic missile systems. While seeking deep cuts in those systems 
most suitable for carrying out first strike, it has promoted the 
retention of adequate retaliatory capabilities by proposing more 
permissive limits on strategic forces that are inherently less 
destabilizing—namely, slow-flying bombers and cruise missiles. The 
United States has also placed a high priority on ensuring that any 
agreement be effectively verifiable. 
With these goals for negotiating the START Treaty, the current 
general approach for the United States is a reduction to equal levels in 
strategic offensive arms for both the United States and Soviet Union. 
These reductions are to be carried out in a phased manner, achieving equal 
intermediate ceilings by agreed dates over a period of seven years from 
56United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament: Agency Annual Report to the Congress, 1989, 
p 12. 
57Max M. Kampelman, "START: Completing the Task", The Washington 
Quarterly, Summer 1989, p 5. Also see Pat Towel 1, "Concessions Step up 
Tempo Toward New Agreements", Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report, 17 
February 1990, p 535. As previously mentioned, Mr. Towell also 
acknowledged that from the beginning the United States negotiating 
position for START has favored bombers over ballistic missiles. 
Additionally, Mr. Towell suggests the reasons for supporting bomber- 
carried weapons over ballistic missile weapons as bombers are both less 
suited to a surprise attack and are vulnerable to enemy air defenses. 
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the date the treaty comes into force. The Soviet Union's position is that 
the reductions are to be carried out in two phases, with equal ceilings 
after phase one. The United States has also maintained that a START 
Treaty will not be contingent on a resolution of Defense and Space issues. 
This position has been accepted by the Soviet Union, except if it is 
determined that the United States has gone beyond the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty as defined by the Soviet Union. On the issue of ABM Treaty 
violations, the United States holds the position that no further strategic 
arms control treaties will be signed with the Soviet Union until the 
violations of the Krasnoyarsk radar are corrected in a verifiable manner 
and meets United States criteria. Presently, the United States has been 
satisfied with the Soviet Union's announcement that the Krasnoyarsk radar 
will be eliminated.58 
From the general approaches of the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the limitations of the START Treaty have evolved. Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union have negotiated from positions that favor 
their respective strategic nuclear force structures. As a result, four 
major areas have been established for the reduction of offensive strategic 
nuclear forces: delivery vehicles, warheads, warhead sublimits, and heavy 
ICBMs. 
According to ACDA's issue brief on April 4, 1990, the proposed 
limitations in these areas are: 
58United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public 
Affairs, "Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. and Soviet Proposals" (ISSUES 
BRIEF), 4 April 1990. 
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1. Delivery Vehicles will be limited to a 1,600 ceiling for 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), which comprise deployed 
ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their 
associated launchers, and heavy (Strategic) bombers. Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union have agreed to these limitations in this 
area. 
2. Warheads have been set at a 6,000 ceiling, to include the 
accountable number of deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads and long-range, 
nuclear-armed ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles), and each heavy 
bomber equipped only for nuclear-armed gravity bombs and short-range 
attack missiles (SRAMs) counting as one warhead. Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union have agreed to these limitations in this 
area. 
3. Warhead Sublimits have been set at 4,900 for ballistic missile 
warheads. Additionally, the United States has supported a sublimit 
for ICBM warheads. The United States has proposed that of the 4,900 
ballistic missile warheads 3,000-3,300 could be ICBMs. In response 
to this proposal, the Soviet Union has proposed that if 3,300 is the 
sublimit for ICBMs then conversely the same sublimit should apply to 
SLBMs. Additionally, the Soviet Union has proposed a sublimit of 
1,100 for deployed heavy bomber-carried warheads. 
4. Heavy ICBMs will be limited to 1,540 warheads on 154 deployed 
heavy ballistic missiles. The United States has also proposed a ban 
on production, flight testing, or modernization of new or existing 
types of heavy ICBMs. In contrast, the Soviet Union proposal agrees 
with the 1,540 and 154 limit but permits production, flight testing, 
or modernization of existing types of heavy ICBMs. The Soviet Union 
does support a ban on the development, testing, and deployment of new 
types of heavy ICBMs.59 
After establishing the limitations on delivery vehicles and warheads, 
the next issue of concern is counting rules. With regard to ballistic 
missile warheads, both sides have agreed that each warhead counts as one 
toward the 6,000 warhead ceiling. Furthermore, both sides agree that a 
heavy bomber equipped only with gravity bombs and short-range attack 
missiles (SRAMs) counts as one SNDV under the 1,600 ceiling and one 
warhead under the 6,000 warhead ceiling.  Presently, a major issue of 
59Ibid. 
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negotiation regarding counting rules is when an ALCM will be counted 
against the 6,000 warhead limit.60 
Both sides have agreed that the United States' heavy bombers will be 
credited with 10 ALCMs. Also, there is agreement by both sides that the 
Soviet Union's current heavy bombers will be credited with 8 ALCMs and 
future Soviet heavy bombers will be credited with 10 ALCMs. The 
controversy is determining the range at which an air-launched missile is 
counted as an ALCM. The United States position is that an ALCM is an air- 
launched cruise missile with a range greater than 1,000 kilometers. In 
contrast, the Soviet Union considers an ALCM as an air-launched cruise 
missile with a range greater than 600 kilometers. Therefore, the 
disparity in defining the range of whether a missile is considered an ALCM 
or not would impact the 6,000 warhead limit.61 With the announcement by 
Secretary of State Baker on May 19, 1990, the range for counting air- 
launched cruise missiles against the 6,000 warhead ceiling had been agreed 
on as being in favor of the Soviet Union proposal of 600 kilometers or 
about 375 miles, but agreement has also been reached to exclude the United 
States "Tacit Rainbow" defensive systems from these limitations.62 
"Ibid. 
61
 Ibid. Also see Michael R. Gordon, "Arms Control Process: Back on 
Track", New York Times, 20 May 1990, p 10. Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. and 
Soviets Close to a Pact on 30% Cut in Nuclear Missiles; Agree on Chemical- 
Arms Curbs", New York Times,  20 May 1990, p 1. 
"Michael R. Gordon, "Arms Control Process: Back on Track", New York 
Times, 20 May 1990, p 10. Also see Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. and Soviets 
Slose to a Pact on 30% Cut in Nuclear Missiles; Agree on Chemical-Arms 
Curbs", New York Times,  20 May 1990, p 1. 
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Another issue of disagreement in the counting rules has been sea- 
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The United States defines a SLCM as a 
sea-launched, nuclear-armed cruise missile with a range greater than 300 
kilometers. In contrast, the Soviet Union defines a SLCM as a sea- 
launched, nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed cruise missile with a 
range greater than 600 kilometers. In any case, SLCMs are not currently 
under the provisions of a START Treaty.63 Of course, the announcement on 
May 14, 1990 of Secretary Baker carrying a new arms-control "package" to 
Moscow which included air-launched and sea-launched missiles could affect 
whether SLCMs are included in a START Treaty.64 
63United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public 
Affairs, (ISSUES BRIEF), 4 April 1990. 
WR. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Officials Head for Kremlin with Arms-Control 
Concessions", The Monterey Herald (Washington Post Service), 14 May 1990, 
p 3. See also William Matthews, "Soviet: U.S. Must Discuss Naval Arms 
Cuts", Navy Times, 21 May 1990, p 24. Barry Schweid, "U.S., Soviets Face 
Missile Issues Today", The Monterey Herald, 16 May 1990, p 1. Barry 
Schweid, "Baker to Press Soviets on Lack of Talks with Baltic Republics", 
The Monterey Herald, 17 May 1990, p 1. Soviet Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, 
chief military adviser to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee warned that if the United 
States did not discuss naval nuclear weapons the Soviet Union would stop 
progress in other nuclear and conventional reduction talks. Of course, 
the position that Marshal Akhromeyev put forth before Congress the week of 
May 7, 1990 was possibly rejected by Foreign Minister Eduard A. 
Shevardnadze on May 16, 1990. In response to questions that the Soviet 
Union had retreated on arms issues, Mr. Shevardnadze replied, "I don't 
think so. This is the view of those who really don't know what's 
happening." These comments by two Soviet high ranking officials just 
prior to completion of the START Treaty could ultimately result in changes 
of the United States negotiating position or the agreement will not be 
signed. In my opinion, the Soviets will not press SLCMs in a START Treaty 
at this time. 
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This announcement could possibly mean that the Soviet Union's 
position on SLCMs was in contrast to the reports in February 1990. 
Ambassador Rowny stated: 
At the February 1990 Ministerial (between U.S. Secretary of State 
James Baker III and Soviet Minister Eduard Shevardnadze), it appears 
that the Soviet Union generally agreed to the concept of a 
declaratory approach as a basis for involving SLCM in arms control 
(i.e., the issuance of politically binding statements regarding the 
number of SLCMs of a specified type and range each side plans to 
deploy. 
The issue of arms control for sea-launched cruise missiles would be 
contradictory to previous policy towards naval arms control and that is-- 
the United States has not negotiated naval arms control. The reason for 
the United States position was presented to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, after Marshal Akhromeyev had testified, by Admiral Carlisle 
A.H. Trost, Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Trost stated: 
As a maritime nation, dependent on seaborne commerce and access to 
the world's markets, the U.S. cannot afford to limit through 
negotiations the very forces that are essential to protecting these 
interests...Restricting sea-launched cruise missiles would pose a 
substantial, if not impossible, obstacle to realistic 
verification. ..The only credible methods would involve an excessively 
intrusive inspection of submarines and ships.66 
With this in mind, the issue of SLCMs in a START Treaty should remain 
a non-negotiable issue at this time.  Furthermore, in my opinion, the 
65Edward L. Rowny, "Arms Control at Arm's Length", US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, p 56. See also Barry Schweid, "Chemical Accord Caps Arms 
Talks", The Monterey Herald, 11 February 1990, p 3A. At the conclusion of 
the Moscow Ministerial in February 1990, it was announced that the most 
significant result of negotiations was an unexpected breakthrough on sea- 
launched cruise missiles. Secretary Baker and the Soviets agreed to take 
sea-launched cruise missiles out of the START Treaty. 
66William Matthews, "Soviet: U.S. Must Discuss Naval Arms Cuts", Navy 
Times,  21 May 1990, p 24. 
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Soviet Union's commitment to the issue does not warrant the United States 
negotiating away SLCMs which are clearly in the favor of the United 
States. With the announcement of Secretary Baker on May 19, 1990, it has 
become more evident that the Soviet position on the SLCM issue is not 
firm. Although it was announced that the United States had agreed to an 
880 limit on SLCMs, Secretary Baker stated that limit would take the form 
of a declaration attached to the strategic arms treaty and would be 
politically binding, meaning it would be a written assurance but would not 
be considered a legal obligation by the United States.67 Additionally, 
the benefits of maintaining SLCMs as far as the United States is concerned 
are not limited to the Soviet Union. SLCMs provide the United States a 
highly sophisticated and flexible weapon that would enhance United States' 
projection of power in the Third World. 
The last major issue that a START Treaty must deal with is 
verification of compliance. From the guidance that was previously 
discussed, the United States will not enter into agreements that are 
unverifiable. The START Treaty creates an unique situation, in that the 
agreement limits classes of nuclear weapons, but does not eliminate a 
class of nuclear weapons as does the INF Treaty68. Therefore, the START 
67Michael R. Gordon, 20 May 1990, p 10. Also see Thomas L. Friedman, 
20 May 1990, p 1. 
"United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public 
Affairs, Understanding the INF Treaty, p 1. ACDA describes the INF Treaty 
as stating, "For the first time in history, the United States and the 
Soviet Union have agreed to destroy an entire class of missiles. The 
sides have also agreed to the most comprehensive package of verification 
measures ever negotiated including on-site inspections."(p 1). 
Furthermore, Understanding the INF Treaty  provides a description of the 
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Treaty must provide at a minimum: exchange of data both before and after 
the reductions take place; on-site inspection to verify data and to 
observe elimination of weapons; continuous on-site monitoring of the 
perimeter and portals of critical production facilities; and short-notice 
inspection of sites where treaty-limited systems are located both during 
and after the reduction period69. 
Currently, the United States and the Soviet Union have specifically 
reached agreement on three issues of verification. First, advance 
notification will be provided for one major strategic exercise involving 
heavy bomber aircraft per calendar year. Second, each side will exhibit 
one type of heavy bomber to demonstrate verification procedures for 
distinguishing between ALCM heavy bombers and non-ALCM Heavy bombers. 
Third, each side will demonstrate its proposed procedures for on-site 
inspection of reentry vehicles for each side's ballistic missiles. 
Additionally, both sides have exchanged information on missile tagging 
following as they pertain to the INF Treaty: background, negotiations, 
ratification, elimination, destruction, inspections, and communications. 
69United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public 
Affairs, "Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. And Soviet Proposals" (ISSUES 
BRIEF), 4 April 1990. Additionally, the United States has proposed to 
accelerate and begin implementing verification and stability measures such 
as: early establishment of on-site perimeter/portal monitoring of certain 
missile production facilities, exchange of data on each side's strategic 
nuclear forces, and addressing the problem of short-time-of-flight SLBMs. 
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technologies and implemented one of the important verification and 
stability proposals announced by President Bush in June 1989.70 
Of course, there are other major areas of apprehension for the United 
States with regard to verification of compliance. The first of these 
areas is non-deployed missiles71. It appears that there are two problems 
70Ibid. For further explanation of Heavy Bomber inspections, see 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public 
Affairs, "START: Heavy Bomber Inspections" (ISSUES BRIEF), 29 January 
1990. Both sides have agreed to conduct reciprocal exhibitions of certain 
Strategic, or heavy bombers. The exhibitions will demonstrate those 
features which distinguish bombers equipped to carry nuclear-armed, air- 
launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) from bombers not equipped to carry such 
missiles. The Soviet Union will display two versions of the Tupolev-95, 
commonly known in the West as the Bear. The United States will display 
two variants of the B-1B. For further explanation of RV inspections, see 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public 
Affairs, "START: RV Inspections" (ISSUES BRIEF), 29 January 1990. The 
START Treaty RV inspection was agreed to by both sides on January 22, 
1990. The agreement will allow each side to conduct reciprocal 
demonstration of each side's proposed procedures for verifying that the 
number of RVs on a ballistic missile is no greater than that specified in 
the START Treaty. This agreement to conduct trial RV inspections marks 
the first time in history that the United States and the Soviet Union will 
inspect the number of nuclear warheads on each other's ballistic missiles. 
For further explanation of Tagging, see United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, Office of Public Affairs, "START: Tagging 
Demonstration" (ISSUES BRIEF), 29 January 1990. Additionally, the tagging 
of missiles is similar to "fingerprints" of an individual. A particular 
tag would be read and compared with a record to verify the missile's tag 
is authentic. For the tags to be effective, they must meet stringent 
requirements: readable with high reliability and precision; durable, 
remaining readable throughout a missile's lifetime; unique and non- 
reproducible; and not susceptible to removal and transfer. 
71United States Arms control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public 
Affairs, 4 April 1990. Also see House of Representatives, Committee on 
Armed Services, "Breakout, Verification and Force Structure: Dealing with 
the Full Implications of START", "Report of the Defense Policy Panel of 
the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives", 24 May 1988, 
pp 2-9. This section of the Defense Policy Panel of the HASC specifically 
addresses concerns of nondeployed missiles. The report points for concern 
of possible cheating by the Soviet Union on undeclared missiles, but 
specifically states that the nondeployed "legal" missiles allowed by START 
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with non-deployed missiles. First, the numerical limit has not yet been 
set on non-deployed ballistic missiles and the warheads attributed to them 
for all ICBMs of a type that has been tested from a mobile launcher. 
Second, the concern of ensuring the Soviet Union will not be able to break 
these missiles out and deploy them on a mobile test-launcher in a crisis. 
A second area that will be difficult for the United States to monitor 
is mobile ICBMs. Even though the United States has agreed to lift the ban 
on mobile ICBMs, the concern appears to be effective verification on 
numerical limits and establishment of guidelines for deployment sites. 
The mobile issues with regard to the Soviet Union's forces have become 
more important, as the two proposed United States' mobile systems have 
continued to be debated by Congress and the Bush Administration for 
funding support. 
After reviewing the proposals of the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the determination of the overall position of the two sides with 
regard to offensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is readily 
discernible. First, the Soviet Union has built their strategic nuclear 
forces on ICBMs. The Soviet ICBM force has developed into Heavy (SS-18) 
and a mobile (SS-24 and SS-25) force. Consequently, the Soviets would not 
likely negotiate on these weapon systems and if they did, their compliance 
may be in question. According to Dr. Kartchner's evaluation of possible 
Soviet violations of SALT agreements, the Soviets have a pattern of 
represent a significant potential for Soviet rapid breakout from the 
treaty. The report states that the legal missiles do not require silos, 
special mobile launchers, or submarines. These missiles can be launched 
at above ground sites off relatively simple stands. 
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maintaining compliance with proposals that they initiate. If the proposal 
is not originally made by the Soviets, the Soviets are more inclined to 
noncompliance, especially on last-minute concessions for political 
sake.72 Therefore, if the United States does propose a ban on mobile 
land-based ICBMs with multiple warheads73, the Soviet Union would most 
likely turn down the proposal. Additionally, an acceptance by the Soviets 
would most likely lead to noncompliance, especially with the verification 
problems that exist. 
Secondly, the United States position will continue to support slow- 
flying delivery vehicles over the fast-flying ballistic missiles. The 
United States proposals will undoubtedly be that the Heavy and mobile 
ICBMs are inherently destabilizing; therefore, these systems should be 
banned. As previously mentioned, the United States position on a START 
Treaty must reflect the technological advantages that the United States 
possesses. Hence, the United States will resist as much as feasible 
discussions on limiting SLBMs and affecting our SSBN fleet. Additionally, 
the United States will increase reliance on Strategic Bombers carrying 
ALCMs. Lastly, the one class of delivery vehicle that the United States 
will try to maintain separate from a START Treaty is SLCMs. 
Kerry M. Kartchner, "Soviet Compliance with a START Agreement: 
Prospects under Gorbachev", Strategic Review, Fall 1989, pp 52-54. Dr. 
Kartchner developed a table of 9 possible violations with SALT agreements 
of which only one was a Soviet proposals. The other 8 possible violations 
were non-Soviet proposals. 
^Robert C. Toth, "U.S. May Push Missile Ban at Arms Talks", Los 
Angeles Times,  31 March 1990, p 13. 
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C. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 
As the United States looks to the future with regard to strategic 
nuclear forces, the area that should receive increased support is a 
transition to a balanced offensive/defensive structure. The importance of 
developing a defensive structure would be invaluable when discussing arms 
control. Currently, the Defense and Space Talks (DST) is the forum for 
discussing defensive systems. The United States' general approach with 
regard to DST is the United States: 
...seeks to facilitate a cooperative transition to a stabilizing 
balance of offensive and defensive forces, should effective defenses 
against strategic ballistic missiles prove feasible. The U.S. also 
seeks to preserve the option to develop and deploy advanced defenses 
when they are ready, at a measured pace and in a cooperative way. 
The United States' position is that Defense and Space issues should be 
addressed in a new treaty. Whereas, the Soviet Union's position is that 
Defense and Space issues should be an integral part of the ABM Treaty. 
The United States views DST as the forum to promote the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI). When referring to SDI being discussed as part 
of DST, Ambassador Rowny states, "Throughout these discussions we continue 
to make clear to the Soviets our commitment to the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI)."76 The United States has pursued SDI from the original 
announcement in the Reagan Administration as an opportunity to move from 
74United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public 
Affairs, "Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. and Soviet Proposals" (ISSUES 
BRIEF), 4 April 1990. 
"ibid. 
76Edward L. Rowny, p 56. 
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an exclusively offensive strategic nuclear weapons posture to an 
offensive/ defensive posture.  Of course, the original reason for 
proposing SDI was to defend against Soviet ballistic missiles. SOI would 
hopefully prevent a Soviet ICBM attack, which has been described earlier 
in this study as the most destabilizing class of strategic nuclear 
weapons. Today, the Soviet ballistic missile threat remains the primary 
rationale for SDI, but as mentioned earlier, the potential threat from 
nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World is steadily 
increasing. 
It is recognized that there are presently two agreements for limiting 
nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation:   the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR).  First, according to ACDA's 1989 report to Congress, the NPT 
entered into force in 1970 and with 140 parties, is the most widely 
accepted arms control treaty in history.  Additionally, ACDA's report 
states: 
Under the NPT, nonnuclear weapon states pledge not to acquire nuclear 
explosives and to accept IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear 
activities as a means to verify that pledge. Nuclear weapon states 
party to the Treaty, i.e., the United States, United Kingdom, and the 
Soviet Union, have pledged not to transfer nuclear explosives to any 
recipient state and not to assist nonnuclear weapon states in any way 
to acquire nuclear explosives. 
Second, the MTCR was established in 1987 with the guidelines to limit 
the risks of nuclear proliferation by controlling transfers that could 
^United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Annual Report to Congress, 1989, p 
60. 
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make a contribution to nuclear weapons delivery systems other than manned 
aircraft. The guidelines were not designed to impede national space 
programs or international cooperation that were not involved in nuclear 
weapons delivery systems. The seven governments who adopted the MTCR were 
the United States, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom.78 
Even with these agreements to limit proliferation, the number of 
countries possessing nuclear and ballistic missiles continues to increase. 
Admiral Trost stated, "By the year 2000, at least 15 nations will be 
producing, or will have acquired ballistic missile technology, and at 
least six are actively developing nuclear weapons."79 It appears that 
the issue of proliferation is not going to decrease in the Third World 
because of NPT and MTCR agreements. This point was made by Senator John 
McCain, member of Senate Armed Services Committee, in a speech before the 
78White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Missile Technology 
Control Regime: Fact Sheet to Accompany Public Announcement", 16 April 
1987. 
^Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost (USN), Chief of Naval Operations, 
"Maritime Strategy for the 1990s", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 
1990, p 94. Also see William Webster, Director of Central Intelligence, 
"Testimony on Nuclear and Missile Proliferation Before the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs", 18 May 1989, pp 9-10. Mr. Webster 
stated that in the long term many countries will not want to rely on 
foreign nations for their arsenal of strategic missiles. Although the 
countries developing these missiles will not be able to make them as 
accurate as the United States' and Soviet Union's missiles, these 
countries and their missiles will be cause for great concern. Also see 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation in the Developing World", Morld Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers, 1988, pp 17-20. ACDA provides a summary of nations that 
have acquired ballistic missiles, the source nation, and whether the 
missile has been deployed. 
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Senate on the report of Iraq acquiring nuclear weapon detonators. Senator 
McCain stated: 
...we have had another grim warning that the process of proliferation 
is now outpacing our faltering efforts at arms control. We have 
heard reports that United States and British officials have 
intercepted a shipment of nuclear detonators to Iraq...We have heard 
reports that they have found yet further proof that behind the 
supposed shield provided by the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, the 
treaties and conventions affecting chemical and biological weapons, 
the missile technology control regime, lurks the reality of a new 
global arms race. 
In my opinion, it is imperative for the United States to ensure 
itself against some radical Third World country that may possess nuclear 
weapons. According to Lieutenant General Robert D. Hammond, Chief of the 
Army Strategic Defense Command, the threat is no longer bi-polar: 
The Third World may not behave as reasonably or as rationally as the 
Soviets. For some of them, the more it hurts, the better they like 
it. If we face an adversary who has ballistic missiles and who's not 
rational, we need some way to defeat the threat not just deter it.81 
General Hammond further commented that the United States will need SDI, 
the "Star Wars" missile shield, more in the future than when President 
Reagan proposed building SDI in 1983.M 
A likely solution to the nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation 
in the Third World is for the United States to continue the development 
and deployment of SDI.  Additionally, it would also benefit world 
^Senator John McCain, Senate Armed Services Committee, "Nuclear 
Proliferation in Iraq", "Congressional Record—Senate" (S3351), 28 March 
1990. 
81William Matthews, "Missiles in Third World Pose New Threat", Navy 
Times,  16 April 1990, p 28. 
MIbid. 
65 
stability to persuade the Soviet Union to cooperate in SDI. The Soviet 
Union should realize that SDI could be vital to their defense as nuclear 
and ballistic missile proliferation increases in the Middle East, a 
geographic location where these weapons could easily reach the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union must realize that the Third World proliferators 
may not act as rationally as the United States when it comes to nuclear 
and ballistic missiles. 
As a result of increasing proliferation in the Third World, the 
United States may have validated the requirement for developing SDI. 
Consequently, the United States, if successful, would be able to pursue 
the goal of an offensive/defensive force structure instead of only 
offensive strategic nuclear forces. Furthermore, SDI would be the first 
phase in arms control leading towards elimination of the most 
destabilizing threat of the Soviet Union's ICBMs. The impact of 
developing and deploying SDI is going to assuredly alter the design and 
composition of the United States offensive strategic nuclear Triad. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The issue of arms control is undoubtedly going to shape the strategic 
nuclear force structure of the United States. Presently, the Bush 
Administration appears to view arms control and especially negotiations on 
strategic nuclear forces as a method to continue the improvement of 
relations with the Soviet Union. The use of arms control in this manner 
is in character with the Bush Administration's philosophy of utilizing 
arms control as a means, but not as an end to development of policies 
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which enhance national security. With this in mind, it is only natural 
that the current arms control discussions will focus on the START Treaty 
and its potential to limit strategic nuclear weapons. 
The START Treaty would enable the United States to promote its long 
term goals of promoting strategic stability through limiting and possibly 
the eventual elimination Soviet ICBMs. While negotiating to achieve this 
goal, skillful negotiating by the United States is required to ensure that 
our technological advantages are not negotiated away. Therefore, the 
United States position will continue to support slow-flying strategic 
bombers and cruise missiles. The one area that the United States will 
relentlessly resist discussing is SLBMs and their launch platform--SSBNs. 
Of course, the Soviet Union will most likely resist the banning of ICBMs 
(Heavy and Mobile) without the United States diminishing its strategic 
nuclear force structure. It may be projected that the target of the 
Soviet Union's proposal will be the United States SLBM force, considering 
that the United States does not have the comparable ICBM force of the 
Soviet Union. This possibility would mean the United States could loose 
a primary technological advantage and therefore must be resisted. 
Consequently, the United States may be required to place more 
emphasis on a balanced offensive/defensive strategic nuclear strategy. 
This will mean the development and deployment of SDI for security against 
the primary Soviet ballistic missile threat. As mentioned previously, the 
strategy for soliciting support for SDI may be the increasing nuclear and 
ballistic missile threat from the Third World. Additionally, a strategy 
of utilizing the Third World as a threat with regard to nuclear and 
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ballistic missiles may entice the Soviet Union to cooperate in SDI and 
ultimately to decide that a policy of eliminating ICBM may be beneficial. 
If this strategy was implemented, the United States would have achieved 
its goal without decreasing areas of United States technological 
advantage. Without doubt the START Treaty and SDI are going to impact the 
United States strategic nuclear Triad for the future. 
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V. STRATEGIC WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM 
The modernization of the United States offensive strategic weapons is 
the essence of the debate concerning the future of the United States 
strategic nuclear Triad. The current modernization program that the 
United States is pursuing was originally ordered under the guidance of the 
Reagan Administration and has been reviewed by the Bush Administration. At 
the conclusion of the review, the Bush Administration reached the decision 
to continue supporting modernization of all three legs of the Triad. 
Needless to say, the decision on full modernization of the strategic 
nuclear Triad is being reevaluated by the Administration and the Congress 
because of the daily changing events in the international environment. 
With this in mind, the most obvious question to be answered is why 
the United States needs an "offensive-minded" strategic nuclear Triad. 
The answer to that overall question was previously addressed when 
discussing the strategic threat and arms control, but the reasoning behind 
the requirement for a specifically offensive-minded strategic nuclear 
Triad has not been addressed. Therefore, a discussion on the program of 
strategic nuclear modernization must be initiated from the standpoint of 
what will these offensive weapon systems provide for our policy of 
deterrence. 
In his prepared statement before the Senate in March 1990, General 
John T. Chain, Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command and Director of 
Strategic Target Planning, stated: 
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...the need for rapid power projection, escalation control, and 
earliest termination of hostilities on favorable terms will remain 
fundamental objectives of U.S. forces...Offensive weapons will remain 
essential to these objectives. Deterrence based solely on defense, 
for example, ensures that the worst thing that can happen to an 
aggressor is that his attack fails--in effect,he loses nothing, and 
stands to gain substantially, in any challenge to U.S. interests. 
Strategic forces must provide certainty of effective U.S. retaliation 
against what an aggressor most values under all scenarios—this is 
the essence of deterrence. 
General Chain's statement reflects his opinion as the senior military 
officer in direct command of the United States strategic nuclear forces; 
therefore, it may be assumed that the modernization of the strategic 
nuclear Triad is the preferred method to maintaining deterrence. 
For understanding the policy to continue the modernization program of 
the strategic Triad, it appears that three points should be addressed. 
The first concerns the original proposals of the Reagan Administration and 
the Scowcroft Commission's report on strategic forces for the Reagan 
Administration. The second is the continued support of the Triad after 
President Bush's strategic review in 1989. The third is an overview of 
the modernization program of the three legs of the strategic nuclear Triad 
as the program currently exists. 
A. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION TO MODERNIZE STRATEGIC TRIAD 
The modernization program of the strategic nuclear Triad was unveiled 
by President Reagan in 1981, but the initiation for such a program was 
most likely from President Carter's Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown. 
^Department of the Air Force, "Strategic Programs", "Statement of 
General John T. Chain (USAF), Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command and 
Director of Strategic Target Planning", 7 March 1990, p 2. 
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Defense Secretary Brown's report to the Congress in 1982 outlined 
Presidential Directive No.59 and the "countervailing strategy".  The 
report stated: 
Our countervailing strategy—designed to provide effective 
deterrence--tells the world that no potential adversary of the United 
States could ever conclude the fruits of his aggression would be 
worth his own costs. This is true whatever level of conflict 
contemplated. To the Soviet Union, our strategy makes clear no 
course of aggression by them that led to use of nuclear weapons, on 
any scale of attack and at any stage of conflict, could lead to 
victory, however they may define victory. Besides our power to 
devastate the full target system of the USSR, the United States would 
have the option for more selective, lesser retaliatory attacks that 
would exact a prohibitively high price from the things the Soviet 
leadership prizes most—political and military control, nuclear and 
conventional military force, and the economic base needed to sustain 
a war...The essence of the countervailing strategy is to convince the 
Soviets that they will be successfully opposed at any level of 
aggression they choose, and that no plausible outcome at any level of 
conflict would represent "success" for them by any definition of 
success.84 
From his description and objectives of a countervailing strategy, 
Secretary Brown's report further suggested that there were five basic 
elements to our force employment policy to achieve the objectives of the 
strategy: flexibility, escalation control, survivability and endurance, 
targeting objectives, and reserve forces.85 It appears evident that this 
new strategy was to be the guide President Reagan was going to follow in 
announcing his strategic modernization program for all three legs of the 
^Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget, FY 1983 Authorization Request and 
FY 1982-1986 Defense Programs, 19 January 1981, pp 39-40. This report 
reflects the FY 1982 Defense Budget as of January 16, 1982. 
85Ibid., pp 40-42. For a complete explanation of each element see the 
entire statement of Secretary Brown from page 40 to 42. Also, Secretary 
Brown emphasizes that the countervailing strategy is consistent with a 
policy of "flexible response" for NATO. 
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strategic nuclear Triad. The announcement of the strategic modernization 
program was announced in the fall of 1981 but was formally presented in 
the 1982 report to the Congress by the new Secretary of Defense, Caspar 
Weinberger. 
Secretary Weinberger's report explained that President Reagan's 
comprehensive program was based on a long-term view and required 
modernization of not just one strategic weapon system, but modernization 
of all the major components at the same time. This meant the 
Administration had to decide on the appropriate method to expand or 
replace the elements of the strategic Triad--ICBMs, SLBMs, and Strategic 
Bombers. Secretary Weinberger added that the Reagan Administration's 
opportunity to modernize the entire strategic nuclear Triad was 
advantageous in eliminating some dangerous contradictions between weapon 
capabilities and the objectives of our policy.86 
Secretary Weinberger also stated that modernization of the strategic 
nuclear forces was needed to end the decline of United States capabilities 
relative to Soviet forces and create a more stable deterrent than formerly 
had existed. He further explained that the modernization was affordable 
and, by specifically designing the program for both near term and long- 
term, the United States would remain secure. Secretary Weinberger's 
statement with regard to these issues was: 
^Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar H. 
Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1983 Budget, FY 1983-1987 Defense 
Programs, 8 February 1982, p 1-18. This report reflects the FY 1983 
Defense Budget as of January 31, 1982. 
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Our strategic program is affordable, it fits within the amounts 
decided upon in March 1981 for strategic programs for the next six 
years...President Reagan's program for strategic forces, while 
consuming less than 15 percent of defense spending over the next five 
years, will give us the greatest addition of modern, strengthened 
strategic forces planned and funded by any United States 
President...The period in the Mid-1980s when major and critical 
components of our present strategic deterrent forces could be 
destroyed by an enemy surprise attack is our most vulnerable 
period...That is why parts of this program are specifically designed 
to secure additional strength for the near term, while at the same 
time we build the long-term strategic forces we need but cannot 
deploy until the end of the 1980s. 
With an explanation of why we needed to modernize the strategic 
forces and the belief that the modernization was affordable, Secretary 
Weinberger explained the elements of the program. President Reagan's 
program consisted of five mutually reinforcing elements: 1) improvement of 
United States communications and control systems; 2) modernization of our 
manned strategic bomber force so that it retains the capability to 
penetrate Soviet air defenses; 3) deployment of new, more accurate, and 
more powerful submarine-launched missiles--the most survivable of our 
nuclear offensive systems; 4) a step-by-step plan to improve the 
survivability and accuracy of new land-based intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) and to reduce their vulnerability; and 5) improvement in 
strategic defenses.88 
President Reagan's plan for modernization of the strategic nuclear 
Triad is best summarized by Secretary Weinberger in his book Fighting for 
87Ibid., p 1-39. 
MIbid., pp 1-39 and 40. For an in-depth description of President 
Reagan's program, Secretary Weinberger's report from page 1-39 to 1-42 
provides the specific details of the modernization of each leg of the 
strategic nuclear Triad. 
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Peace.    With regard to the strategic nuclear force, Secretary Weinberger 
described the energies of the Reagan Administration for the first two 
years as: 
...regaining offensive deterrent strength—and that meant modernizing 
and strengthening all three legs of our strategic nuclear triad. The 
effort required the development and deployment of the B-l and Stealth 
bombers to replace the B-52, the MX to replace the Minuteman, and the 
D-5 submarine launched missile to replace the earlier, less accurate 
missiles that lacked also the capability of destroying hardened 
Soviet military targets. That program faced no opposition within the 
Administration; and generally, with the exception of the MX missile, 
the modernization effort was supported as well by the Congress.89 
Of course, Secretary Weinberger's assessment with regard to the MX and its 
lack of full support by the Congress was to be amplified in the Scowcroft 
Commission's recommendations. 
In 1982, the Scowcroft Commission was established by the White House 
to assess the same strategic nuclear problem that had been addressed by 
DoD and Secretary Weinberger.  The Scowcroft Commission report was 
completed in April 1983 and, as previous reports, it supported a strategic 
nuclear Triad. The report stated that the Triad served several purposes, 
but three points were highlighted:  first, the existence of several 
components to the strategic Triad forced the Soviets to solve a number of 
different problems and then plan to overcome; second, different components 
would require the Soviets in an all-out attack to make choices of which 
targets to attack, therefore reducing the effectiveness against one 
component to attack another; and third, each component of the strategic 
wCaspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in 
the Pentagon, p 301. Additionally, former Secretary Weinberger elaborates 
on discussions by members of Congress concerning the Strategic Bombers and 
the MX missile, pp 301-303. 
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forces has an unique characteristic which is not found in the other 
components.90 
With these purposes for a varied strategic nuclear force, the 
Scowcroft Commission assessed each component of the strategic nuclear 
Triad and made recommendations for the future strategic Triad. The 
Scowcroft Commission recommended that the sea-based leg should continue 
with the Trident submarine construction program, and the Trident II (D-5) 
ballistic missile should be continued with high priority; also the report 
recommended development of a small submarine in case an Anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) technological breakthrough developed. As far as the 
Strategic Bomber leg was concerned, the Scowcroft Commission did not 
recommend any changes but did recognize the bomber leg provided mutual 
support to the survivability of the ICBM force. Lastly, the Scowcroft 
Commission addressed the ICBM issue in a manner to describe the three main 
strategic purposes of the ICBM programs and then explain in detail a new 
modernization program for the future.91 
It is my opinion, from the decision by the Scowcroft Commission to 
discuss the ICBM program in detail, that the ICBM program's volatile 
future was recognized. The Scowcroft Commission recommended three areas 
for modernizing the United States' ICBM force. First, the engineering 
design should be initiated on a single-warhead ICBM weighing about fifteen 
tons with full-scale development in 1987 and initial operating capability 
^White House, Report   of   the  President's   Commission   on  Strategic 
Forces  (Scowcroft Commission), April 1983, pp 7-8. 
91Ibid., pp 10-22. 
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(IOC) in the early 1990s. Second, 100 MX missiles should be deployed in 
existing MINUTEMAN silos for modernizing of the ICBM force. Third, a 
specific program to resolve the uncertainties regarding silo and shelter 
hardness should be undertaken, leading to decisions about hardening MX in 
silos and deploying a small single-warhead ICBM in hardened silos or 
shelters. Also, investigation should proceed on different types of land- 
based vehicles and launchers, including hardened vehicles.92 
From reviewing the initiation of the modernization of the strategic 
nuclear Triad under the guidance of the Reagan Administration from 1981 to 
1983, it is possible to determine that the .same problems are being 
encountered by the Bush Administration in 1990. The main problem is 
deciding on the issue of an ICBM for the strategic nuclear Triad for the 
future. As Secretary Weinberger's book implies, the decision of the 
Scowcroft Commission to compromise on MX and suggest development of the 
single-warhead missile, the so-called Midgetman, has given opponents a 
method of opposing ICBM modernization. Specifically, Secretary Weinberger 
stated: 
The Midgetman was a favorite missile of the MX opponents—primarily, 
I always felt, because it was easier for them to support a missile we 
did not, and would not, have for several years. 
921bid., pp 10-22. For further analysis on the Scowcroft Commission's 
report, see the Section on the Strategic Modernization Programs. This 
section describes each leg of the strategic Triad and provides both 
overall and detailed recommendations for improving the United States 
strategic nuclear Triad.. 
93Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in 
the Pentagon,  p 303. 
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With the earlier events of the modernization program in mind and General 
Scowcroft being selected as National Security Adviser to President Bush, 
it was inevitable that a new strategic nuclear review was going to be 
conducted. 
B. PRESIDENT BUSH'S STRATEGIC REVIEW 
President Bush directed an early strategic nuclear review for 
possibly two reasons. The first reason was President Bush wanted a review 
conducted of the United States negotiating position with regard to 
strategic nuclear weapons before the START Treaty negotiations would 
resume. The second reason for the review was that the Bush Administration 
was required to make an early decision on the ICBM issue. Congress had 
voted in the 1989 Defense Authorization to require President Bush to 
decide by February 15, 1989 between additional research on the rail-mobile 
MX or to divert funds for deploying single-warhead road-mobile Midgetman 
missile.94 As may have been expected, the deadline for the announcement 
was delayed until the Bush Administration completed its review of United 
States strategic policy in what was called National Security Review 12. 
^Jeffrey Smith, "Early Deadlines on Arms Issues", Washington Post, 
28 November 1988, p 2. This report highlighted that General Scowcroft was 
a long time supporter of the Midgetman program as well as ranking members 
of the Democratic Party in Congress. The article also stated that Bush's 
campaign advisers had said the President-elect was leaning toward the MX 
rail-mobile. From this article in late November 1988, the stage was set 
for requiring a new strategic review for the Bush Administration. 
^Jeffrey Smith, "Bush Will Miss Deadline on Land-Based Missile Pick", 
Washington Post, 15 February 1989, p 17. Also George C. Wilson, "Military 
Budget to Precede Strategic Review", Washington Post, 10 April 1989, p 17. 
These two articles described the issue of choosing a new mobile missile as 
continuing to be at the center of controversy between the Department of 
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For a complete understanding, it should be realized that during the 
same time period the strategic review was being conducted; the defense 
budget was being debated before Congress for approval.  From this 
situation, it may be ascertained that any recommendations from National 
Security Review 12 would not affect the budget, but the budget may affect 
the recommendations of the strategic review. This procedure may be known 
as the "cart-before-the-horse" with regard to budget first and strategy 
second, and was most likely the subject of new Secretary Cheney's 
statement in April 1989: 
Given the ideal world we'd have a nice, neat, orderly process. We'd 
do the strategy and then we'd come around and do budget. This city 
doesn't work that way.96 
Secretary Cheney's statement acknowledged the overall impact that the 
budget has on strategy.  Therefore, the recommendations of the Bush 
Administration's strategic review of not solely committing to either the 
MX or the Midgetman mobile system was probably as much a budget decision 
as a strategy decision. 
In July 1989, DoD submitted to Congress its. report to comply with the 
FY-89 National Defense Authorization Act. DoD's report reflected the Bush 
Administration's policy towards the modernization of the strategic nuclear 
Triad in a post-START environment. The report stated: 
Defense and the desires of General Scowcroft and ranking members of 
Congress. Therefore, no consensus agreement could be reached by the 
deadlines that had been established by the 1989 Defense Authorization. 
^George C. Wilson, "Military Budget to Precede Strategic Review", 
Washington Post,  10 April 1989, p 17. 
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While we have made no final decisions about the force allocation 
among the various legs of the Triad, the Administration strongly 
believes that continued modernization is absolutely essential for our 
national security and that a fully modernized strategic Triad must 
provide the basis of all START force structure options. The 
recapitalization of our strategic Triad must proceed with or without 
a START treaty in order to replace or supplement aging systems with 
modern weapons. In this regard, deployment of the Trident SSBN, D-5 
SLBM, the Peacekeeper missile in rail-garrison, the new small ICBM, 
6-2, ACM. and SRAM II are all essential and must continue on 
schedule. 
The essence of the report is reflected in the list of components of the 
strategic nuclear Triad that should be supported in the future. It may be 
argued that the DoD report was completed before the historical events of 
the last half of 1989, and the support for all these components have 
changed. Of course, this is not the case because the modernization of a 
full strategic nuclear Triad is continuing to be supported in reports by 
the Bush Administration. 
The fact that the Bush Administration maintains a firm commitment to 
the strategic nuclear Triad and a full modernization program is firmly 
stated in President Bush's 1990 report on "National Security Strategy of 
the United States".   President Bush's report advocates that full 
modernization of the offensive components of the strategic nuclear Triad 
is required by stating: 
Decisions on strategic modernization that I have already made take 
advantage of the most promising technologies in each leg of our Triad 
to increase stability. The B-2 bomber will ensure our ability to 
penetrate Soviet defenses and fulfill the role the bomber force has 
played so successfully for forty years. The D-5 missile in Trident 
submarines will exploit the traditionally high survivability of this 
''Department of Defense, Report to the Congress on the Analysis of 
Alternative Strategic Nuclear Force Postures for the United States Under 
a Potential START Treaty  (Unclassified Version), July 1989, p 2. 
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leg and add a significant ability to attack more hardened targets. 
In a two-phase program for our ICBM force, the deployment of the Rail 
Garrison System will enhance stability by removing Peacekeeper 
missiles from vulnerable silos and providing the mobile capability we 
need for the near term. In the second phase, deployment of the small 
ICBM road-mobile system will further strengthen stability and 
increase force flexibility...While we ensure that each leg of the 
Triad is as survivable as possible, the existence of all three 
precludes the destruction of more than one by surprise attack and 
guards against a technological surprise that could undermine a single 
leg.98 
The conviction of President Bush in his support for modernization 
does not appear to reflect any plan to decrease the components of the 
future strategic nuclear Triad of the United States. To the contrary, it 
appears from President Bush's guidance in his 1990 national security 
strategy and the DoD report from July 1989 that the Administration is 
still proposing to expand the strategic nuclear Triad by developing both 
the mobile MX and Midgetman missile systems.  This assessment may be 
substantiated from reviewing Defense Secretary Cheney's report to the 
President and the Congress for 1990, which states that one of the four 
guiding priorities for development of the FY 1991 budget request is the 
strategic nuclear modernization program.99   Additionally, Defense 
98White House, national Security Strategy of the United States, March 
1990, p 24. 
"Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Annual 
Report to the President and the Congress, January 1990, p 9. Also see 
Department of Defense, "Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney 
Before the Senate Budget Committee in Connection with the 1991 Budget for 
the Department of Defense", 5 February 1990, pp 5-6. Department of 
Defense, "Department of Defense Fiscal Year 1991 Budget: A Briefing by 
Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense", 29 January 1990, pp 9-10. These two 
reports also list modernization of strategic nuclear forces as one of the 
FY 1991 budget priorities but both these reports show strategic 
modernization as one of six priorities to reflect changes that occurred 
with regard to budgetary constraints after Defense Secretary Cheney's 
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Secretary Cheney's budget for the offensive strategic nuclear Triad in FY 
1991 included requests for funding specific components of each leg: the 
18th Trident submarine and 52 Trident II missiles; special trains for the 
Peacekeeper missile and continued development of the small ICBM; and 5 B-2 
stealth bombers and 100 advanced cruise missiles.100 
From the commitment that the Bush Administration has maintained for 
the strategic nuclear Triad from its strategic review in mid-1989 to 
testimony by Secretary of Defense Cheney as current as March 1990, the 
ever-present policy has continued to be a full modernization of the 
strategic nuclear Triad. With this in mind, a brief overview of the 
modernization of each leg of the strategic nuclear Triad will be provided, 
since the purpose of this study is to determine policy, not conduct a 
technological review and assessment. 
C. OVERVIEW OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD SYSTEMS UNDER MODERNIZATION 
For the purposes of this study, an overview of each of the legs of 
the strategic nuclear Triad will be conducted. This section will focus on 
the attributes of each leg and the capability that each leg provides. Of 
course, the most influential description of each leg of the Triad comes 
from the responsible service for a particular leg. With this in mind, the 
annual report had been printed. 
100Department of Defense, "Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney Before the Senate Budget Committee in Connection with the FY 1991 
Budget for the Department of Defense", 5 February 1990, p 10. Also see 
Department of Defense, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public 
Affairs), "FY 1991 Department of Defense Budget Request", 29 January 1990, 
P 4. 
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descriptions of each leg of the United States strategic nuclear forces for 
the future will be based on posture statements and testimony of the senior 
officials in the respective service--Air Force or the Navy. 
1. Land-based Ballistic Missiles 
The land-based ballistic missile forces for the United States are 
built on the concept of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). In 
The United States Air Force Report to the 101st Congress of the United 
States of America  for FY 1991, the Air Force describes the ICBMs as: 
...the most responsive element of the Triad. ICBMs have nearly a 
100-percent alert rate and comprise nearly half of the nation's day- 
to-day alert weapons. They are capable of prompt response and can 
hold the hardest of the high-priority, time-sensitive, high value 
Soviet warfighting assets at risk, including command and control 
facilities and ICBM silos. The silo-based ICBM's relatively low 
operation and maintenance costs, high reliability, secure and highly 
confident connectivity, planning flexibility, quick response time, 
and sovereign basing distinguish it among the strategic forces.1 
It must be remembered that the United States' position with regard to a 
START Treaty is to limit the fast-flying and first strike capable 
ballistic missile force. From the Air Force's statement of the benefits 
of ICBMs, it appears that our negotiating position and reason for having 
ICBMs are going to oppose each other with a START Treaty. 
Of course, the issue which is the focus of discussion concerning 
ICBMs is mobile basing. As described earlier, the United States has been 
attempting to determine the best weapon system to fulfill this requirement 
101Department of the Air Force, The United States Air Force Report to 
the 101st Congress of the United States, Fiscal Year 1991,p 22. Also see 
Department of the Air Force, Air Force Issues Book, 1989, p 22. These two 
reports provide further descriptions of the importance and why overall 
modernization of the ICBM force is needed for the future. 
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since 1981.  Presently, the discussion continues to focus on the rail- 
mobile MX, with its multiple warheads, and the road-mobile Midgetman, with 
its single warhead.  As previously mentioned, the Midgetman has been 
supported by General Scowcroft (President Bush's National Security 
Adviser) and by the chairmen of the two armed service committees (Sen. Sam 
Nunn and Rep Les Aspin).  In the June 26,1989 issue of the U.S. News S 
World Report,  it was reported that both Sen. Nunn and Rep. Aspin favored 
the Midgetman with its "extravagant price tag" because they believed the 
MX could not move quickly enough to avoid a surprise attack.102  Also 
earlier in 1989, Rep. Aspin had reportedly stated placing MX missile on 
rails was contingent upon building the Midgetman as well.103 
As far as support for the MX, it has been from DoD and the Air 
Force. In the same report that Rep. Aspin had tied Midgetman to MX, the 
Air Force leaders and in particular General Larry D. Welch, Chief of Staff 
for the Air Force, were acknowledging that most likely only one mobile 
missile system would be built; therefore, the Air Force preference was the 
MX.104  Additionally, the Air Force's report to Congress for FY 1991 
supported the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison as the method of modernizing and 
making ICBMs more survivable by stating: 
Operationally and fiscally, this is the most effective way to obtain 
a modernized, more survivable ICBM force. Rail Garrison can respond 
102Richard Perle, "Defending People by Defending Rockets", U.S. News 
& Uorld Report,  26 June 1989, pp 39-40. 
103George C. Wilson, "Air Force Acts to Break Impasse: New Options 
Offered on MX, Midgetman", Washington Post,  24 March 1989, p 1. 
104Ibid, 
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immediately to a highly unlikely "bolt-out-of-the-blue" attack with 
its low-cost, nearly 100-percent peacetime alert mode and ability to 
launch directly from garrison.105 
The heated and diverse discussion over the MX and Midgetman as 
the mobile ICBM for the future has consequently resulted in neither system 
being deployed as of yet. This lack of consensus highlights Secretary 
Weinberger's statement that the Midgetman came into existence as 
opposition to the MX.106 Thus, the Midgetman has been possibly viewed 
with the philosophy of being so far in the future that it would never 
reach development.  Ultimately, the outcome would be that mobile ICBMs 
would not be deployed and the most likely rationale was stated by 
Ambassador Paul Nitze in his book From Hiroshima to Glasnost.    Ambassador 
Nitze stated: 
A number of proposals had been put forward in interdepartmental 
meetings to increase the power and, more importantly, the 
survivability of U.S. ground-based retaliatory forces. Each of the 
proposals, however, ran into strong opposition. With respect to 
mobile systems the difficulty revolved around the interface between 
such systems and the public—people just don't like to have missiles 
with nuclear warheads moving about the countryside near their homes 
and workplaces. 
105Department of the Air Force, The United States Air Force Report to 
the 101st Congress of the United States of America, Fiscal Year 1991, p 
24. See also Department of the Air Force, Air Force Issues Book, 1989, pp 
23-24. Both reports advocate that the Midgetman would compliment the MX, 
but if the choice has to be made between the two systems the Air Force 
supports the MX. 
106Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in 
the Pentagon,  p 303. 
107Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York: Grove 
Weidenfeld, 1989), p 400. The italics and bold face was added to the 
quote by myself to add emphasis. It is my firm belief that Ambassador 
Nitze's statement is absolutely true. Not unlike the Europeans, with 
regard to the now INF banned GLCMs, the United States public does not want 
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From this discussion, it is my opinion that the future of mobile ICBM 
systems is going to remain a subject for controversial debate. 
Consequently, the United States mobile systems will continue to be 
stretched-out in budget discussions with a long-term desire of limiting or 
banning mobile ICBMs. 
2. Sea-based Ballistic Missile Components 
The sea-based leg of the United States strategic nuclear Triad is 
composed of two components: the nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
submarine (SSBN) and its Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). As 
far as the strategic modernization program is concerned, the current and 
future program associated with both components of the sea-based leg is 
referred to as the Trident program. The Trident program has become the 
focal point of the future strategic nuclear force structure because of its 
overall survivability and new weapon capabilities of the Trident II (D-5) 
missile to attack hardened targets. These two capabilities have 
stimulated considerable debate over the possibility of the SLBM being able 
to replace the ICBM and ultimately changing the strategic nuclear force 
structure from a Triad to a Dyad. 
When reviewing the contributions of the sea-based leg of the 
strategic nuclear forces, the Navy's opinion is best described in the 
Navy's report to the Congress for FY 1990 and 1991 by Secretary of the 
Navy H. Lawrence Garrett, III. In the report, Secretary Garrett states: 
to see vehicles loaded with nuclear missiles being dispersed into the 
countryside. Additionally, this attitude will only get stronger against 
mobile systems as the public senses a continued lessening of world tension 
especially with the Soviet Union. 
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The U.S. ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at sea are the most 
survivabTe and cost effective leg of the strategic triad. The 
continued modernization of a secure sea-borne retaliatory force with 
communications reliability comparable to land-based systems is vital 
to American strategic security. Modernization of the SSBN force with 
new Trident submarines and D-5 missiles is underway, on time and on 
budget...Submarine-based missile systems offer another benefit in 
wartime as a means for augmenting or reconstituting space-based 
systems. Moreover, sea-borne systems, with their inherent mobility 
and freedom from base or overflight restrictions, hold great promise 
as cost-effective, flexible, and survivable platforms to support our 
strategic defenses and provide means to counter enemy space 
systems. 
From Secretary Garrett's statement, two areas are specifically 
addressed when discussing the sea-based leg of the strategic nuclear 
Triad. The first area concerns the strengths of the sea-based leg which 
are the cost-effectiveness and the overall survivability. In a prepared 
statement before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee. Admiral 
Trost stated: 
Our nation's dependence on this force will grow in a post-START 
environment. The TRIDENT missile-carrying submarine is reaching 
maturity at precisely the right time in our nation's history to 
enable us to safely weather the period of strategic and defense 
uncertainty that lies ahead. Providing nearly 50% of the nation's 
strategic warheads for only 25% of the total strategic cost, the 
potent and extraordinarily accurate TRIDENT/D-5 system will, for the 
foreseeable future, remain the most cost-effective and survivable 
element of the nation's strategic deterrent capability. 
108Department of the Navy, "A Report by the Honorable H. Lawrence 
Garrett, III, Secretary of the Navy, on the Posture and Fiscal Years 1990- 
91 Budget of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps", Department of the Navy 
Report to the Congress, Fiscal Years 90-91,  pp 8-9. 
109Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost (USN), "Statement by Admiral C. A.H. 
Trost, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House 
Appropriations Defense Subcommittee on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1991 
Budget of the United States Navy", 22 February 1990, p 13. Also see 
Department of the Navy, "Prepared Statement by The Honorable H. Lawrence 
Garrett, III, on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1991 Budget of the U.S. Navy 
and Marine Corps", pp 2-3. Both statements make the issue of the sea- 
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Admiral Trost's statement highlights the cost-effectiveness of the Trident 
program and is undoubtedly a major factor for the program not being under 
constant attack as the other legs have been during the modernization of 
the strategic nuclear Triad. Also, the Trident program has been able to 
maintain its schedule of development and achieve operational certification 
of the D-5 missile110. 
The second area of discussion with regard to the sea-based leg is 
its connectivity for communications. This area is most usually labelled 
as a negative point and the main argument against the SSBN force replacing 
land-launched ICBMs.  The Navy's position to this argument is that the 
communications to SSBNs are redundant and timely. In a statement before 
the Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials of the 
House Armed Services Committee, Vice Admiral Daniel L. Cooper (USN), 
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), stated: 
The strategic submarine force is controlled through a reliable, 
redundant, continuous and reconstitutable communication system. 
Comprehensive evaluations prove the SSBN's ability to maintain 
based leg providing 50% of the deliverable strategic warheads for 25% of 
the strategic budget. Additionally, Secretary Garrett suggests that the 
new, more accurate, and long-range D-5 missile will serve our deterrent 
needs well in an era of sharply reduced strategic inventories. The 
important difference between the two statements is that Secretary Garrett 
does not mention the START Treaty, but just says in an era of reduced 
strategic inventories. This could be a subtle indication of changes to 
come whether START happens or not. 
110
..., "Nuclear Sub Launches Tridents", The Monterey Herald (AP), 13 
February 1990, p 2. Also see William Matthews, "Another Bust for Trident 
II", Navy Times, 28 August 1989, p 25. As with all programs, the D-5 
encountered flight tests problems in March 1989 and August 1989, but the 
Navy was able to correct the problem with minor delays. When the USS 
Tennessee fired two missiles in 20 seconds in February 1990, the Tennessee 
was certified to deploy with the D-5 Missile on operational patrol. 
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continuous communications with the National Command Authority. Our 
communication program will promote crisis stability by assuring that 
National Command Authority orders can be delivered before, during or 
after a nuclear attack on the United States.1. 
As might be expected from review of the past112, the debate over 
connectivity with SSBNs will continue. Also, it must be mentioned that 
Captain James R. Lynch (USN) believes the communication capability with 
the SSBNs is timely enough for a prompt response. Captain Lynch, when 
referring to improved communication capabilities and the alteration of 
U.S. SSBN operating areas, stated: 
As a result of all this, the submarine-launched ballistic missile 
(SLBM) can now deliver a prompt response, a capability previously the 
sole domain of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). 
111Vice Admiral Daniel L. Cooper (USN), Assistant Chief of Naval 
Operations (UNDERSEA WARFARE), "Statement of Vice Admiral D. L. Cooper, 
U.S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (UNDERSEA WARFARE) Before 
the Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials of the 
House Armed Services Committee on Status of Submarine Force", 7 March 
1990, pp 12-13. 
112Rear Admiral William J. Holland, (USN, Ret), "The Link to the 
Boomers: The Triad's Best", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 
1988, pp 41-50. Richard B. Kelley, "The Link to the Boomers: A Bad 
Connection", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1988, pp 41-51. 
Also see Rear Admiral William J. Holland, Jr. (USN, Ret), "The End of the 
Triad? Why SSBN Advances Make a Dyad Possible", Arms Control Today, 
September 1989, pp 10-14. The discussion in the two articles in the 
January 1988 issue of Proceedings is typical of the debate over SSBN 
connectivity. Of course, Rear Admiral Holland's experience with dealing 
with the communications of a SSBN does give credibility to his support for 
SSBNs. Also, Rear Admiral Holland's article in the September 1989 issue 
of Arms Control Today states that there is no practical difference between 
the reliability and speed of communications with SSBNs and any other leg 
of the Triad. 
113Captain James R. Lynch (USN), "Triad or Dyad", U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings,  January 1990, p 62. 
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Although it is only my opinion, the communications with the SSBNs is 
highly efficient and should not affect a future decision to alter the 
strategic nuclear force structure of the United States. 
It is recognized that one area has not been addressed with regard 
to the survivability of the SSBN. The issue concerns the possibility of 
an "ASW breakthrough" in the future. As in the past, it is the opinion of 
the Navy that an ASW technology breakthrough is not in the foreseeable 
future.   Specifically addressing the issue of a technological 
breakthrough, Vice Admiral Cooper stated before the Subcommittee on 
Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials of the House Armed Services 
Committee: 
The combination of technical advances with changes to operational and 
tactical procedures, all under constant review, continues to 
guarantee the survivability of our sea based strategic 
forces...Independent conclusions consistently agree: There is no 
scientifically plausible prospect for an ASW technology breakthrough 
which would provide a basis for a threatening attack on our SSBN 
forces through the 1990s and probably well beyond.1 
Finally, it is my opinion that the sea-based leg of the strategic 
nuclear Triad has increased in stature with the strategic nuclear 
modernization program. The modernization program has continued with the 
construction of Trident SSBNs and has been responsible for the development 
and deployment of the Trident II (D-5) missile. Other improvements such 
mVice Admiral Daniel L. Cooper (USN), "Statement of Vice Admiral D. 
L. Cooper (USN), Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (UNDERSEA WARFARE) 
Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials 
of the House Armed Services Committee on Status of Submarine Force", 7 
March 1990, p 14. Also see Rear Admiral J. Holland, Jr. (USN Ret), "The 
End of the Triad? Why SSBN Advances Make a Dyad Possible", Arms Control 
Today, September 1989, p 14. Captain James R. Lynch (USN), "Triad or 
Dyad", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,  January 1990, p 62. 
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as communication capabilities have also contributed to the ascent of the 
sea-based leg of the strategic nuclear Triad. With all the factors that 
have been presented, it appears that the sea-based leg will become the 
premier leg of the future strategic nuclear forces of the United States. 
3. Strategic Bombers 
The Strategic Bomber leg of the strategic nuclear force has been 
under considerable scrutiny and controversy during the strategic 
modernization program. The controversy has centered on the requirement 
for manned bombers, especially the B-2 (Stealth Bomber).  A current 
explanation for manned bombers has been supplied by General Chain, 
Commander-in-Chief of SAC and Director of Strategic Target Planning, when 
he stated that national guidance required the U.S. strategic forces must 
hold several targets at risks. These targets may vary from either being 
time sensitive, highly defended, "hard" targets, or mobile (which is 
officially referred to as relocatable). Consequently, General Chain states 
the operational targeting philosophy as: 
We are careful not to be completely reliant on any one system for all 
targets in a specific group. This is because no system in the Triad 
is, or ever will be, perfect—the probability of arrival of any 
weapon is always less than one. Therefore, to ensure success we use 
weapons from more than one leg of the Triad against very important 
targets...Except for those targets which must be hit quickly, all 
target groups can be and are targeted with bombers. In other words, 
a significant portion of the Soviet target base can be struck with a 
bomber weapon. In addition, a number of targets fall into a category 
we call "look-shoot" targets...The manned penetrating bomber is 
ideally suited for targets in the look-shoot category. In this case 
the bomber flies to the target. Depending on the damage observed by 
the crew, they can strike it with a very accurate gravity bomb or 
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short range attack missile or pass by it and go to the next assigned 
target.11!r 
General Chain's statement is vital to the understanding of why he feels 
the United States should continue to update the strategic bomber forces. 
Additionally, it may be ascertained from his statement that strategic 
bombers have an inherit ability to be flexible and adapt to a dynamic 
wartime scenario. 
In its report to Congress for FY 1991, the Air Force has 
amplified General Chain's description by highlighting the flexibility 
aspect of the bomber leg as: 
Bombers are the most flexible leg of the strategic Triad. They can 
be launched to either increase their survivability or to signal 
national resolve during a time of national crisis before a decision 
is made to employ weapons. They can be redirected or recalled, 
accomplish attack assessment, and be reconstituted for follow-on 
missions. Additionally, bombers offer the best potential for 
searching out and striking relocatable targets. 
Additionally, the Air Force advocates in the "Air Force Issues Book, 1989" 
that manned bombers can carry a large number and variety of nuclear and 
conventional weapons, attack widely separated targets, and engage 
imprecisely located targets by using aircraft sensors to determine target 
location.117  From these statements, it is obvious that the Air Force 
115Department of the Air Force, "Strategic Programs", "Statement of: 
General John T. Chain, Jr. (USAF), Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air 
Command and Director Strategic Target Planning", 7 March 1990, p 11. 
116Department of the Air Force, The United States Air Force Report to 
the 101st Congress of the United States of America, Fiscal Year 1991, p 
24. Also see Department of the Air Force, Air Force Issues Book, 1989, p 
25. 
117Department of the Air Force, Air Force Issues Book,  1989,  p 25. 
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believes it is essential to maintain a highly sophisticated bomber force 
to penetrate air defenses, conduct high yield strategic nuclear weapon 
attacks, and verify attacks on important targets. 
For the Air Force to accomplish these missions with their 
strategic bombers, the Air Force has concentrated on deploying two bombers 
during the strategic modernization program to ensure all operational 
requirements will be met in the future. First, the B-1B has been 
developed and deployed since the Reagan Administration announced its 
strategic nuclear modernization program in the early 1980s. The B-1B was 
developed as a 100 aircraft program to satisfy the strategic bomber 
requirement in the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. The program has already 
accomplished its goal, and the B-1B has been fulfilling the Single 
Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) alert commitments since October 1, 
1986.118 
According to the Air Force, the B-1B performs the penetration of 
a manned bomber better than any other operational aircraft in the world. 
The B-1B will penetrate with a typical profile of 200 feet above ground 
level at speeds in excess of 600 miles per hour for both flat/rolling and 
mountainous terrain. Of course, the development has not been without 
problems. The flight tests revealed an Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) 
problem which has been traced to a basic deficiency in the design of the 
defensive avionics system.  The Air Force has initiated a program to 
118Department of the Air Force, Air Force Issues Book, 1989,  pp 25-26. 
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alleviate the problem by installing a stand-alone radar warning 
receiver.119 Even though the B-1B has had an ECM problem, the program 
appears to have been highly successful because the B-1B was able to 
achieve operational status and begin standing the SIOP alert in 1986. As 
far as the future of the B-1B, it will continue to be the front-line 
penetrating bomber for the foreseeable future. It should also be 
recognized that the conventional capability of the B-1B will provide a 
long-term mission option as the international environment changes. 
The second strategic bomber to be developed under the strategic 
modernization program has been the B-2. The B-2 program has become the 
subject of considerable debate and was one of four aircraft programs now 
planned for acquisition to be reviewed by Secretary of Defense Cheney in 
early 1990120. The primary focus of the B-2 debate is the cost of the 
program, for which DoD requested $5.5 billion dollars for five aircraft in 
FY 1991.121  Even though the cost of the B-2 program has created an 
"'Department of the Air Force, The United States Air Force Report to 
the 101st Congress of the United States of America, Fiscal Year 1991, pp 
25-26. Also see Department of the Air Force, Air Force Issues Book, 1989, 
pp 25-28. The Air Force Issues Book, 1989 provides a more detailed 
description of the B-1B penetration capability and also discusses the ECM 
problem. 
120Department of Defense, "Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney Before the Senate Budget Committee in Connection with the FY 1991 
Budget for the Department of Defense", 5 February 1990, p 15. Also see 
Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Fiscal Year 1991 Budget: A 
Briefing by Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense", pp 14-15. The four 
specific aircraft programs that Secretary Cheney ordered to be reviewed 
were the B-2, C-17, A-12 (ATA), and the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF). 
121Department of Defense, "Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney Before the Senate Budget Committee in Connection with the FY 1991 
93 
attitude of "sticker shock", the Air Force believes that the B-2 is 
essential to the future of the Strategic Bomber force. 
General Chain stated the requirement for the B-2: 
...as the Soviet defenses increase toward the turn of the century, 
the B-52s must transition to a standoff cruise missile role and the 
B-1B will have to be moved to less highly defended areas. Without 
the B-2, by the late 1990s we will only have 97 penetrating bombers 
and they will be effective only against lesser defended targets. We 
still will have to have a penetrating bomber to get into those highly 
defended areas where the targets the Soviets hold most dear are 
located--and that's where the B-2 stealth bomber will pay large 
dividends ...The B-2 is a warplane that will keep ahead of any 
adversary well into the next century and is a keystone in leveraging 
U.S. strength against Soviet weaknesses...I believe the B-2's unique 
capabilities will allow it to survive in highly defended regions and 
hold at risk a wide range of Soviet offensive and force projection 
forces on an enduring basis.122 
Additionally, General Chain emphasized the B-2 would promote strategic 
stability by being too slow for use as a first-strike weapon, but capable 
of rendering the other side's first strike as suicidal.123  From the 
requirement behind the need for the B-2 in the future, the question to be 
answered is: what makes the B-2 so unique? 
For the purposes of this review, the description of the B-2 in 
the Air Force's report to Congress for FY 1991 will be utilized. 
Budget for the Department of Defense", 5 February 1990, Chart #13. Also 
see John Boatman, "Five B-2s Ordered, New Weasel Axed", Jane's Defence 
Weekly, 3 February 1990, p 179. In the February 3, 1990 issue of Jane's 
Defence Weekly, DoD's request for the B-2 program in FY 1991 was divided 
into a projected cost of $3.8 billion for procurement and $1.6 billion for 
R&D. 
122Department of the Air Force, "Strategic Programs", "Statement of: 
General John T. Chain, Jr. (USAF), Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air 
Command and Director Strategic Target Planning", 7 March 1990, p 13. 
123Ibid., p 13. 
94 
According to the Air Force's report, the B-2's technology is a 
generational leap by: 
...effectively integrating United States low-observable technologies 
(radar, infrared, electromagnetic, visual, and acoustic) into a 
large, aerodynamically efficient aircraft, creating a highly 
survivable bomber with long range and a heavy payload capacity. The 
B-2's low-observable characteristics significantly reduce the 
response time of enemy forces, providing the B-2 the best opportunity 
to penetrate sophisticated air defenses and attack targets with a 
wide range of weapons...The B-2 program is currently in its flight 
test phase. The first aircraft flew on July 17, 1989, and the flight 
test plan has continued on schedule. 
The capability of the B-2 will only be realized as the flight test program 
continues. Afterwards, the decision on whether the B-2 has been a success 
or a budget disaster may be put forth. 
Of course, it must be stated that the Air Force advocates the B-2 
program will consume less of the defense budget over its procurement 
period (1.3 percent) than either the B-52 (1.4 percent) or the B-1B (1.6 
percent).125 Additionally, it should be remembered that the B-2 
incorporates new technologies that must be absorbed into the cost of the 
program. The Air Force states that almost one-third of the cost of the B- 
2 program has been devoted to research and development, of which three- 
fourths has already been invested. Therefore, the Air Force's position on 
the cost of the B-2 program is that it should be compared in terms of 
flyaway costs, or the actual cost of producing one aircraft. On this 
basis, the Air Force calculations are a B-2 costs about $274 million (FY 
12
*Department of the Air Force, The United States Air Force Report to 
the 101st Congress of the United States of America, Fiscal Year 1991, p 
26. 
125Department of the Air Force, Air Force Issues Book, 1989,  pp 27-28. 
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89 dollars) and the B-1B costs about $228 million.126 In my opinion, the 
potential capability of the B-2 in both a strategic nuclear role and a 
conventional role warrants the further development and deployment of the 
B-2. 
In summary, the Strategic Bomber leg of the strategic nuclear 
forces will continue to be vital. Strategic bombers provide flexibility 
and are recallable after they have been launched. Additionally, the START 
Treaty counting rules are designed to favor the strategic bombers; 
therefore, it is imperative to the national security of the United States 
to deploy the most highly capable and technologically advanced strategic 
bombers. Of course, the B-2 is in this category and should be deployed as 
soon as feasible. However, if the technological benefits of the B-2 
become unattainable, then the United States should be prepared to resume 
production of the supersonic B-1B. It is my opinion that whatever the 
changes may be in a future strategic nuclear force structure of the United 
States—strategic bombers will remain an integral part. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The modernization of the strategic nuclear forces of the United 
States will continue to be a priority, as it has been since President 
Reagan announced his strategic modernization program in 1981. The focus 
of the discussion on the modernization program will be on the individual 
components, not the overall requirement for modernizing strategic nuclear 
forces. Therefore, it is possible that an entire leg of the strategic 
126Ibid., pp 26-27. 
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nuclear Triad may be targeted for discussion or debate on viability. As 
the review of this chapter has shown, decisions which may lead to 
jeopardizing an entire leg of the strategic nuclear Triad would be counter 
to the stated guidance of both the Reagan Administration and the current 
Bush Administration. 
The possibility of a debate on one entire leg is a real likelihood in 
the future. Although the case may be made, the United States strategic 
nuclear force structure has already become the target of restructuring. 
In actuality, except for deployment of silo-based MX, the United States 
has not gone forward on the modernization of the ICBM leg of the strategic 
Triad since the issue of mobile systems arose with the Scowcroft 
Commission. There are probably several reasons for the lack of 
commitment, but the most significant thought on the subject may have been 
Ambassador Nitze's statement that the United States general public does 
not want strategic nuclear missiles in the countryside. This line of 
thinking also contributes to Secretary Weinberger's feeling that people 
supported the Midgetman just to oppose the MX. Also, it must be 
remembered that the negotiating position of the United States has opposed 
fast-flying ballistic missiles, and before the Wyoming Ministerial in 
September 1989, the United States opposed mobile missiles. With these 
thoughts in mind, it would appear that the ICBM leg for the future may 
come into question. 
In contrast, the sea-based and Strategic Bomber legs retain broad- 
based support and appear to be continuing with their modernization 
programs. Although the pace of the modernization is below the level of 
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initial programming, both of these legs have deployed systems outlined in 
the preplanned modernization program. The sea-based leg with the Trident 
SSBN and the Trident II (D-5) missile has been highly successful and 
appears destined to become the premier leg of the United States strategic 
nuclear forces for the future. Also, the Strategic Bomber leg has 
developed and deployed operationally the B-1B. It is recognized that the 
B-2 has and will continue to undergo difficulty with funding constraints, 
but the reality is that the program is currently test flying prototype B-2 
aircraft. Therefore, it is my opinion that the B-2 will continue 
development, but as been suggested, in fewer numbers. Additionally, the 
START Treaty counting rules favor the United States continuing development 
of highly sophisticated and technological strategic bombers. 
In summary, the United States strategic nuclear forces will continue 
as a priority for modernization to maintain strategic deterrence. The 
structure of the strategic nuclear forces may change, especially with the 
continual debate on a mobile ICBM. Consequently, the strategic nuclear 
Triad could be in for a possible restructuring, but it is unlikely this 
recommendation will come from Bush Administration, because of its 
continued declaratory support for the strategic nuclear Triad. Therefore, 
if such a recommendation is made in a time of decreasing defense budgets, 
it will most likely be the decision of Congress that requires a 
restructuring of the strategic nuclear force structure of the United 
States. 
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VI. CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE 
The final and in my opinion most important contributing factor to 
decisions affecting the United States' strategic nuclear forces for the 
future is the influence of the United States Congress. It must be 
recognized that the influence of the Congress ranges over a wide spectrum 
of strategic decision-making for the national security of the United 
States. The Congress not only votes the final approval of the defense 
budget, but also has the final approval authority for ratification of 
treaties and foreign aid to countries that are deemed as vital to the 
national security of the United States. In essence, Congress' influence 
is not limited to a simple cause and effect of one factor such as the 
budget determining the final outcome, but rather the influence of Congress 
is varied. This variety of options permits Congress to enter the 
strategic decision-making process through an assortment of factors such as 
overall force levels, negotiating positions of treaties, and the 
preference for a certain weapon system type over another. 
In my opinion, the Congress' ability to influence the entire spectrum 
must be realized and for this research will be referred to as 
"Congressional influence". The importance of Congressional influence must 
be realized from the exhausting process of defense related testimony 
presented before Congress. When issues or programs are presented before 
the Congress, salesmanship is required to ensure Congress is provided with 
information for making intelligent decisions on defense issues. Also, it 
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may be paramount to the future of a strategic program or component to 
highlight an issue or program's overall contribution to the national 
security of the United States. 
It will be the intention of this chapter to demonstrate the 
importance of Congressional influence in determining the United States 
strategic nuclear force structure of the future. From a review of the 
sources utilized for this study, it should be readily apparent that the 
statements of current and former defense experts were prepared 
specifically for the United States Congress. Also, it must be recognized 
that the testimony before defense committees in early 1990 has been 
centered on the strategic nuclear Triad. The testimony has focused on the 
effect of a START Treaty on the daily changing international environment 
and the ultimate requirement of modernizing the individual components of 
the strategic nuclear forces. The Congressional influence will become 
even more apparent as the agreements of the 1990 Washington Summit come 
under review. Of course, it must be mentioned that the Congress has been 
reviewing the potential implications of a START Treaty since the spring of 
1988. 
In the first part of 1990, the Congress conducted a series of 
hearings which resemble similar hearings in May 1988. The 1988 hearings 
reflected the same basic theme and concern of the Congress as the current 
1990 hearings. As Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee of the House of Representatives, opened the May 1988 Defense 
Policy Panel's hearings on U.S. Strategic Forces and START, Rep. Aspin 
stated: 
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...we are beginning a set of hearings in preparation for President 
Reagan's visit to Moscow to meet with General Secretary Gorbachev. 
In particular, we want to get an idea about where the START 
negotiations have gone; what is happening in regard to the force 
structure that accompanies our negotiating position in START; where 
we think the START agreement is going to go; how much progress might 
be made at the summit and other related questions. 
Although two years have passed since the 1988 Moscow meeting, it is 
readily apparent that the same concerns of Congress in 1988 still exist 
prior to the 1990 Washington Summit. The 1990 hearings have been for the 
purpose of assessing the daily changes in the international environment as 
pertaining to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  Also, it must be 
believed that changes in the international environment and the signing of 
a START Treaty will undoubtedly impact the future strategic nuclear force 
structure of the United States. 
With this in mind, a review of the previous chapters and the major 
points indicates the impact that the Congress may have on determining the 
United States strategic forces of the future. The review also highlights 
the requirement for recognizing the need for Congressional support and a 
willingness of the Bush Administration to work toward a position of 
cooperation.  Additionally, it must be noted that the views of the 
Congressional leadership on defense issues are of major significance to 
the future of the defense program. This point is especially important 
127House of Representatives, Defense Policy Panel, "U.S. Strategic 
Forces and START", "Hearings Before the Defense Policy Panel of the 
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives", 16 and 17 May 1988, 
p 1. The importance of this 1988 hearings is that the same type of 
hearings have been conducted by the Senate and House Armed Services 
Committees during the early part of 1990. 
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with regard to the views of defense leaders in Congress as pertaining to 
the strategic nuclear force structure in a post-START environment. 
A. RECOGNIZING THE REQUIREMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT 
As has been presented earlier in this study, the previous factors 
have all related to either developing a position of cooperation between 
the executive branch and legislative branch or providing expert opinions 
to the Congress for a determination of the strategic nuclear forces of the 
future. Therefore, a brief review of the important aspects of how the 
requirement for Congressional support has affected the interrelationship 
of the previously presented factors of this study is warranted.  The 
review will summarize the interrelationship of Congress to the four major 
areas introduced in preceding chapters:  President Bush's national 
guidance; strategic threat; arms control and a START Treaty; and the 
strategic modernization program. 
First, the desire to achieve Congressional support, which is a 
political reality of the United States, comes directly from President Bush 
in his 1990 report of the "National Security Strategy of the United 
States". President Bush clearly states the requirement for cooperation 
between the executive and legislative branches: 
...in an era of rapidly changing strategic conditions, new openings 
for peace, continuing uncertainties, and new varieties of danger. 
We thus face new opportunities and new problems, both of which 
demand of us special qualities of leadership—boldness, vision, and 
constancy. It is my responsibility to meet the challenge, and I am 
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prepared to meet it in a spirit of close cooperation and 
consultation with Congress.1 
From President Bush's commitment to work with the Congress on national 
security strategy, it is only logical to believe that the Bush 
Administration's defense proposals would be oriented towards policies 
where compromise could take place with the Congress.  Also, President 
Bush, as previous presidents before him, was most likely acknowledging 
that policies or defense programs that are not supported by Congress will 
be a wasted effort; therefore, it would be advantageous to develop 
programs in concert with the Congress rather than in a defense department 
vacuum. 
Second, the strategic threat during the 1990 hearings has been 
presented to the Congress from two perspectives. The first perspective is 
DoD and especially Defense Secretary Cheney's viewpoint that the Soviet 
Union's strategic nuclear forces have not changed with regard to 
capabilities. This view by DoD is based on the fact that the Soviet Union 
is the only nation with the capability of destroying the United States. 
The second perspective is based on assessments of former defense 
department officials from previous administrations. It would appear that 
the focal point of the reevaluation is the opinion of former defense 
department hard-liners, such as Mr. Richard Perle on the changing 
environment. 
128White House, National Security Strategy of the United States March 
1990, p 32. Also see footnote 12, President Bush's commitment to working 
with the Congress is asserted in his explanation of the Constitution 
giving the executive and legislative branches separate powers, but 
cooperation is required for a consensus on basic policy. 
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With Mr. Perle acknowledging changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, it may only be realistic to believe that the Congress will pursue 
options for possible changes in the United States strategic nuclear 
forces. Mr. Perle has indicated that deeper cuts of the United States' 
and Soviet Union's strategic arsenals should be made when he stated: 
We can go significantly lower, probably to half the levels now 
contemplated...We have other requirements for our resources, even 
within the military, and I do not like to see us buy more than we 
need.129 
Of course, the decisions of the Congress on the future strategic nuclear 
force structure must take into consideration both perspectives. 
Third, it must be considered that the Congress may view arms control 
and especially, a START Treaty as an opportunity for major changes in the 
future strategic nuclear Triad of the United States. The Congress and in 
particular, the Senate could delay or decide against ratification of the 
START Treaty if the position negotiated was diametrically opposed to the 
position of Congress. The perfect example of general guidance for a START 
Treaty was the conclusions of the Defense Policy Panel review in May 1988; 
the conclusions of the panel were: 
In summary, U.S. strategic force structure planning under START 
should put a high premium on survivability, penetrability, coverage 
of Soviet targets and redundancy in our strategic forces. How much 
of each of these characteristics is enough for crisis stability with 
deep cuts in strategic forces is a complicated matter that must be 
129Michael R. Gordon, "Stocking the Atomic Arsenal:  How Much 
Deterrence to Buy?", New York Times,  23 May 1990, p 1. 
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successfully resolved if there is to be a stable START 
agreement. 
From these conclusions, it is readily apparent which issues the House 
Armed Services Committee deemed important for a stable START Treaty. 
Also, it would be logical that Congress will support the modernization of 
the strategic nuclear forces that possess the capabilities to meet these 
operational requirements. In my opinion, this statement is significant 
for support of forces that are flexible and provide multiple capabilities 
such as survivability and penetrability. The two legs of the Triad that 
best fit these requirements according to the Navy and Air Force would be 
SSBNs and Strategic Bombers. In my opinion, the Congress' position for a 
ratifiable START Treaty will determine the future strategic force 
structure of the United States. 
When discussing arms control of the future, it is essential to 
discuss the future of SDI. This area of arms control is one that has been 
debated as possibly leading to violation of the ABM Treaty; therefore, the 
ABM Treaty might require modification or abolishment. It is believed that 
once Congress ratifies a treaty, it does not easily agree to violate or 
abandon the treaty. In the case of SDI, it may be advisable for a new 
strategy to be developed for Congress to support SDI in the future. 
Therefore, it may be believed that SDI negotiations will be conducted 
130House of Representatives, Defense Policy Panel, "Breakout, 
Verification and Force Structure: Dealing with the Full Implications of 
START", Report of the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives, 24 May 1988, p 40. For a thorough 
account of the subjective matter, the entire publication is highly 
recommended for background on the START Treaty as pertaining to the 
critical issues of a potential START Treaty. 
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within the limits of the ABM Treaty or utilize new emerging threats, other 
than the Soviet Union to justify SDI deployment. This rationale would 
lead one to think that promoting SDI as a potential benefit for both the 
United States and the Soviet Union against nuclear and ballistic missile 
proliferation would be a plausible strategy for gathering congressional 
support. 
Fourth, the strategic modernization program has been setback due to 
lack of consensus between the Congress and the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations. The primary focus of non-consensus is the ICBM program, 
which has been subjected to continual discussions on its survivability and 
mobility. As previously stated in the modernization chapter, the issue of 
modernizing the ICBM leg of the strategic Triad has been debated ever 
since the 1983 report of the Scowcroft Commission. The decision to deploy 
either the MX or Midgetman mobile system remains to be settled because of 
disagreement between the executive and legislative branches. If limited 
to one system, DoD and the Air Force continue to prefer the MX, but the 
Congress and in particular the two armed services chairmen (Sen. Nunn and 
Rep Aspin) maintain support for the Midgetman131. 
Also, it has been reported that Sen. Nunn has warned that both MX and 
Midgetman will be rejected by Congress unless the Bush Administration 
proposes to ban the rail MX and the SS-24.132 In my opinion, the ICBM 
131Robert C. Toth, "U.S. May Push Missile Ban at Arms Talks", Los 
Angeles Times,  31 March 1990, p 13. 
132Ibid. The article provides a further assessment that the message 
from Capitol Hill is a willingness to support the MX missile system, so a 
future ban could be proposed for the SS-24.  Therefore, the MX would 
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issue has basically been left for the Congress to decide because the Bush 
Administration has continued to request funding for both the MX and 
Midgetman.  This statement may be supported by Senate Majority Leader 
George Mitchell's statement: 
I don't think there's any chance the administration's proposal to 
fund both (the MX and Midgetman) will be enacted. 
Additionally, Rep. Aspin has reportedly supported the same position 
by expressing his doubts the administration will receive its two-missile 
program.134 Of course, it must be mentioned that the most influential 
testimony on the ICBM issue may have been presented in February 1990 by 
three former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The three former 
chairmen were reportedly in support of cancelling plans to modernize the 
United States land-based nuclear missile force which included the MX and 
Midgetman if the United States and the Soviet Union reach a strategic 
weapons treaty.135 In my opinion, the Congress has not reached agreement 
on the mobile ICBM issue because Congress does not totally support mobile 
ICBM systems being deployed in the countryside. 
As far as the other two legs of the strategic nuclear Triad--sea- 
based and the strategic bombers, the debate has focused primarily on the 
become a bargaining chip to get the Soviets to. give up their comparable 
missile the SS-24. 
133H. Josef Hebert, "Cheney Opposed to Hasty Cutback in U.S. 
Weaponry", The Monterey Herald,  5 February 1990, p 1. 
13
*Robert C. Toth, "U.S. May Push Missile Ban at Arms Talks", Los 
Angeles Times,  31 March 1990, p 13. 
135H. Josef Hebert, "Cheney Opposed to Hasty Cutback in U.S. 
Weaponry", The Monterey Herald,  5 February 1990, p 1. 
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budget and what is affordable. The budget debate of these two legs are 
unlike the ICBM issue that is being debated for survivability and 
stability reasons. The reason for the affordability issue is that the 
weapon systems have either already been deployed operationally or the 
weapon system is in some phase of testing. Therefore, the budget issue is 
how many weapon systems of a particular component is bought. Presently, 
it appears that the sea-based leg of the strategic nuclear Triad is under 
the least scrutiny by the Congress. The sea-based component has been held 
as the model of the strategic nuclear modernization program and, with the 
successful deployment of the Trident II (D-5) missile in the spring of 
1990, will most likely continue to be supported by the Congress. The 
final leg to be assessed by the Congress is the strategic bombers and the 
affordability of the B-2. 
The B-2 issue of affordability will most likely be a compromise 
between the Bush Administration and Congress. The reason is that Congress 
has supported the negotiating position of favoring strategic bombers; 
therefore, the advertised technological improvement of the B-2 is being 
deemed essential to modernization of the Strategic Bomber force. 
Additionally, the B-2 program is not concentrated in one congressional 
district or state. Consequently, it is logical to believe that the 
support in Congress is more diversified and may be beneficial to the 
continued development of the B-2, even though at a lower quantity than 
originally requested. Of course, the other option for the bomber force 
would be the reopening of the B-1B production line, although it appears 
such as option is not being considered by the Congress. Ultimately for a 
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weapon system to make it to production, it is essential to have 
Congressional support. 
In summary, the review of the previous four areas has led only to 
further substantiation that the Congress will decide the future strategic 
nuclear force structure of the United States, either directly through 
budget approval or by ratification of a START Treaty. Also, it appears 
that a START Treaty will be instrumental in the future of the United 
States' ICBM force, in particular the mobile systems. In my opinion, the 
lack of support by the Congress for either the MX or Midgetman mobile ICBM 
system since 1983 cannot be overlooked as an indicator of a possibly new 
strategic nuclear force structure on the horizon. From the Defense Policy 
Panel's conclusion in 1988, and the subsequent negotiating position of the 
United States, it appears that the congressional leadership has influenced 
the direction of the strategic nuclear force structure of the future. 
B. INFLUENTIAL CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON DEFENSE ISSUES 
A review of Congressional influence on the future strategic nuclear 
force structure of the United States would not be complete without 
discussing the impact of Congressional leadership concerning defense 
issues. Although it is recognized that individual Congressmen should not 
determine the future of strategic nuclear forces, the reality is that 
certain positions of leadership in Congress are afforded the opportunity 
to make such determinations. Consequently, for the purpose of this study, 
it has been essential to highlight two positions and the individuals that 
hold those positions in Congress. 
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Naturally, the positions of influence on defense matters are the 
chairmen of the Armed Services Committees in the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. As previously mentioned throughout this study, the 
current chairmen of these two committees (Sen. Nunn and Rep. Aspin) have 
been extremely influential in the mobile issue for ICBMs. Also, both 
chairmen have been advocating further changes in defense, ranging from an 
altered strategy to a revised defense budget. These two positions are not 
the only ones that will impact a future force structure. However for this 
section the statements of Sen. Nunn have been selected to highlight the 
possible influence of Congressional leadership on defense decisions 
relating to future strategic nuclear forces. 
To understand the potential influence of Sen. Nunn on the future of 
defense, two speeches which he presented before the Senate in March 1990 
should be analyzed. On March 22, 1990, Sen. Nunn addressed the Senate and 
provided the results of the Armed Services Committee's review of the 
Administration's FY 1991 Defense Budget and the Five Year Defense Plan. 
Sen. Nunn's assessment was that these reports contained at least five 
fundamental blanks which he labelled as: threat blank, strategy blank, 
dollar blank, force structure blank, and program blank.136 From these 
five areas of concern by Sen. Nunn, it is easily understood that changes 
may be required in the budget request for FY 1991 and the Five Year 
136Sen. Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
"Defense Budget Blanks", "Prepared Statement of Sen. Nunn Before the 
Senate", 22 March 1990, pp 1-2. For Sen. Nunn's detailed description of 
each blank, his speech should be reviewed in its entirety to understand 
his reasoning for selecting these five areas for review by DoD. 
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Defense Plan. It is my opinion that the overriding theme of this speech 
highlights the need for overall change in defense forces; therefore, it 
should be realized that all programs, including the strategic nuclear 
forces will be reevaluated. 
The influence of the Congress and in particular, Sen. Nunn with 
regard to defense cannot be misunderstood from Sen Nunn's closing remarks 
as to the responsibility of his committee: 
...the Armed Services Committee will meet our responsibilities to 
the Senate in the authorization process for national defense 
programs. In the absence of Administration decisions on major 
program and force structure issues, the Committee will rely on our 
own best judgements about the changes in the threat and our military 
strategy, and the implications of these changes for the future 
structure of our military forces in reaching decisions on the FY 
1991 Defense Authorization Bill...I am constantly being asked for a 
bottom-line number. I don't know any logical way to arrive at such 
a figure without analyzing the threat; determining what changes in 
our strategy should be made in light of the changes in the threat; 
and then seeing what force structure and weapons programs we need to 
carry out this revised strategy. To decide on the size of the 
defense budget without first going through this process would be 
little better than pulling a number out of the air. 
In my opinion, Sen. Nunn's remarks clearly state the essence of this 
review which is that Congress will be the deciding factor with regard to 
strategic nuclear forces, and their judgements will be based on 
testimonies and information presented before Congressional committees. 
The second speech of Sen. Nunn on March 29, 1990 was specifically 
oriented to analyzing the changing environment and determining an up-to- 
date threat assessment. Of particular interest, Sen. Nunn utilized 
specific testimony from several experts on threat assessment and defense 
137Sen. Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. 22 
March 1990, pp 22-23. 
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issues that have been referred to earlier in the threat assessment chapter 
of this study.138  In his closing remarks, Sen Nunn stated that an 
updated threat assessment was required for addressing the critical 
question of "how much is enough" to deter or defend against these threats 
and protect our security interests.139 In giving his opinion of how the 
question should be answered, Sen. Nunn stated: 
...we cannot simply take our lead from opinion polls. We cannot 
simply pick a number out of the air. Nor can we necessarily rely on 
past policies or historical precedents. There is no precedent for 
the collapse of Communism. Nor can we ask the American people to 
pay for a defense posture that is based on yesterday's threat. Our 
assessments must be based on today's realities and not yesterday's 
stereotypes...Our strategy must be revised to reflect the changed 
threat environment. We must then determine what forces and what 
level of defense spending are required to implement our revised 
strategy.140 
It is recognized that Sen. Nunn restated some opinions in both speeches, 
but the message and guidance from the chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in March 1990 was clear on the point that he wanted a 
new strategy with appropriate changes in force structure to meet the 
changing threat environment for the 1990s. Of course, the changes that 
138Sen. Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
"The Changed Threat Environment of the 1990s", "Prepared Statement of Sen. 
Nunn Before the Senate", 29 March 1990. Sen. Nunn's speech covers the 
entire spectrum of threats in the world. With regards to the Soviet 
Strategic threat (see pp 11-14), he does recognize that the Soviets have 
continued their modernization of strategic forces, but also makes the 
point that changes in these forces have taken place such as cutbacks in 
Blackjack bomber production, cessation of Yankee-class SSBN patrols, and 
the halting of Bear-H bomber patrols to the north of Canada. In his 
comments on the Soviet strategic threat, Sen. Nunn utilizes several points 
from CIA Director Webster's testimony in January 1990. 
139 Ibid., p 20. 
uoIbid., p 20. 
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are recommended must be affordable in an era of declining defense budgets. 
The speeches of Sen. Nunn are vital to an understanding of Congressional 
influence not only because these remarks are the opinion of one 
Congressional leader, but also their ramification most likely will be felt 
throughout the entire Department of Defense. 
In summary, the impact of the opinions of Congressional leaders, 
which reflects the attitudes and opinions of the general public, cannot be 
disregarded or neglected. From this brief review of the opinions of one 
key leader, it may be possible to determine the overall influence which 
the Congressional leadership will have on the strategic nuclear forces for 
the future. It is recognized that the choice of Sen. Nunn may be viewed 
by some as biased in determining the views of Congressional leaders, but 
it must be realized that Sen Nunn's views and opinions are highly 
respected on defense issues. Additionally, it has not been the intention 
to promote one view, rather to indicate how one Congressional leader has 
used testimony to advance his thinking and opinions on defense issues. 
Therefore, it is important that Congressional testimony on defense issues 
be accurately presented and helpful for formulating the opinions of 
Congress on defense matters. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Congressional influence with regard to future strategic nuclear 
forces for the United States is a reality that strategic planners do not 
like to consider. In the changing international environment and fiscal 
realities, the strategic nuclear forces which are supported by Congress 
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and in particular, the Congressional leadership, will be the basis of the 
strategic nuclear force structure for the future. Additionally, it is 
advantageous to recognize that Congressional authority is not limited to 
budget decisions, but is influential throughout the spectrum of decision- 
making with regard to national security. As the review of the previous 
four factors indicated, the influence of Congress is ever-present and must 
be considered when assessing the future design of United States' strategic 
nuclear forces. 
The Congressional factor is most readily acknowledged in President 
Bush's guidance on national security for working together with Congress. 
Additionally, this understanding of Congress' position on the mobile ICBMs 
for the strategic nuclear Triad has led the Bush Administration to delay 
making a choice. Rather, the choice appears to have been left for 
Congress. Conversely, the issue of the supporting the B-2 has been 
continued by the Bush Administration because the Congress has supported a 
favorable position for strategic bombers in a START Treaty. Of course, it 
is acknowledged that the current production level is much less than 
initially proposed, but the point is that Congress appears to support 
strategic bombers. 
The Congressional influence over the negotiating position for a START 
Treaty is a major point of discussion. The position of Congress for 
negotiating the START Treaty has a two-fold purpose which appears to 
promote slow-flying bombers and to ban mobile systems from being developed 
by the United States. Congress has two methods to accomplish this goal: 
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first, not funding a mobile ICBM system for the United States; and second, 
not ratifying the START Treaty. 
The START Treaty ratification would be of major consequence. 
However, it is my opinion the Bush Administration conducted its strategic 
review in 1989, then decided to delay a selection of a mobile ICBM because 
in actuality Congress does not want mobile ICBMs. Therefore, it would 
appear that the United States is leaning toward altering its strategic 
nuclear force structure from the Triad to what has been fashionably 
labelled a Dyad. This decision would be based on a Congressional 
decision, not a decision by the Bush Administration, which has continued 
to support the strategic nuclear Triad through declaratory statements. 
The focal point of a Congressional decision on the strategic nuclear 
force will be the views of the Congressional leadership and in particular, 
the leaders responsible for defense matters. This study has concentrated 
on the two leaders of the Armed Services Committees and their opinions, 
especially with regard to the ICBM leg. Nonetheless, the opinions of the 
leadership in Congress will affect all areas of developing a national 
security strategy for the United States. This fact was made apparent by 
analyzing Sen. Nunn's speeches in March 1990. In my opinion, the final 
result is that the Congressional leadership's opinions must be formulated 
from accurate information on issues, or these leaders will pursue their 
own method of determining the Congress' position in areas such as threat 
assessment and weapon systems development. 
Finally, it is imperative, as the Bush Administration has realized, 
to understand the influence of Congress and the importance of legislative 
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and executive cooperation. This does not mean Congress should be allowed 
all the decision-making power, but rather decisions should be reached 
through compromise. However, if compromise with regard to defense issues 
is not an option, it may be necessary to educate the Congress on the 
reasons for resolving an issue in a particular manner. Furthermore, 
educating Congress on requirements is a more prudent approach of 
salesmanship than trying to force an issue on the Congress. With this 
thought in mind, it may be advisable for the future strategic nuclear 
force structure of the United States to be reassessed. Of course, the 
conclusion of this reassessment should be recommendations for programs 
that are supportable and defendable before Congress. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The central objective of this study has been to review and analyze 
five areas which may establish the policy and guidance criteria for future 
strategic nuclear force structure of the United States. From this review, 
it appears that the process of strategic decision-making with regard to 
the strategic nuclear force structure is not easily understood. 
Consequently, a determination of the future strategic nuclear force 
structure of the United States will most likely not be exclusively 
determined from a conventional view based on national interests and 
national strategy. Rather, the future strategic nuclear forces will 
probably be determined from a compilation of contributing factors. 
In discussing the subject of strategic nuclear forces, the research 
of this paper has addressed what appears to have become the traditional 
categories of discussing the strategic nuclear forces: national interest, 
strategic threat, arms control, and the strategic modernization program. 
Also, it has become a reality that recognition of current and future 
fiscal constraints are required for any assessment to be accurate and 
credible with regard to designing force structures for DoD--this appears 
especially true for the strategic nuclear forces. While recognizing the 
possible impact of fiscal constraints, it has become apparent that 
Congress' power or influence is more wide-ranging than only the budget. 
With this in mind, the research of this paper was expanded to a more 
inclusive concept which this thesis has labelled "Congressional 
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influence". By encompassing the influence of Congress into one area of 
discussion, it appears from the evaluation of other areas that a prime 
determinant factor for a future strategic nuclear force structure will be 
the United States Congress. 
In my opinion, the conclusions from the issues discussed in this 
study have provided an insight on Congressional influence being the most 
influential factor on strategic decision-making for the future strategic 
nuclear force structure of the United States. Therefore, the strategic 
nuclear force structure, whether Triad or Dyad, will be determined from 
Congress' impression of the issues. Congress will most likely decide on 
nuclear weapon systems which provide survivability and flexibility for 
meeting requirements in a changing international environment and a 
fiscally constrained budget. In my opinion, the programs and weapon 
systems that ultimately may become the structure of the strategic nuclear 
forces will require salesmanship to Congress by indicating a capability to 
meet a variety of future requirements not focused solely on strategic 
nuclear war. 
A. SUMMARY 
The design of this study was to extrapolate a logical approach to 
determining the future strategic nuclear force structure from the initial 
guidance of the President on national security strategy in conjunction 
with the new broad category of Congressional influence. As the 
conclusions on the issues have indicated, the influence of Congress in 
strategic decision-making is not limited to the issue of the budget, but 
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is in reality ever-present. Consequently, Congressional influence must be 
realized and programs presented with the perspective that Congress will 
ultimately decide the program's future. With this in mind, the purpose of 
the following summary is to highlight, in my opinion, Congress' influence 
in the future strategic nuclear forces of the United States. 
First, President Bush set the stage in his acknowledgement of the 
requirement for his administration to work with the Congress on 
development of the national security of the United States. The point of 
working with the Congress has and most likely will be continued, since the 
Bush Administration has not proceeded with strategic programs that are in 
total contrast with expressed views of the Congressional leadership. This 
interpretation of the Bush Administration's policy toward strategic 
nuclear forces is best described with the decisions of the administration 
regarding mobile ICBMs and the B-2 program. 
The most evident example of not pursuing a program that would place 
the Bush Administration at the opposite end of the spectrum with Congress 
is the decision on mobile ICBM systems. The Bush Administration's position 
has been to continue to support both the MX and Midgetman system, while 
understanding fully that only one system would be approved. It appears 
that the Bush Administration's strategy has been to let the Congress make 
the choice between the two systems or, maybe no choice at all. The option 
of no choice at all may be the policy, since it cannot be determined for 
certain whether the Congress supports any mobile ICBM system for the 
future. 
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On the other hand, a program that the Bush Administration has 
continued to support is continued production of the B-2. The difference 
is that Congress has supported a negotiating position which supports slow- 
flying bombers in the START Treaty; therefore, Congress is likely inclined 
to ultimately approve technological modernization of the strategic 
bombers. This methodology would lead one to believe that Congress will 
support the B-2, although reduction in the quantity produced will be 
required, because of fiscal constraints. It is my opinion that these two 
examples exemplify the overall acknowledgement by the Bush Administration 
of the influence of Congress and the intention of only proceeding with 
programs that Congress will ultimately approve. 
Second, assessment of the strategic threat in the changing 
international environment of the 1990s remains essential. In assessing 
the strategic threat, this study concentrated on the Soviet Union, which 
is deemed as the only nation with the capability to destroy the United 
States. For evaluating the Soviet Union's strategic threat, two 
approaches were utilized. The first approach was based on analyzing the 
actual capabilities that the Soviet Union possesses. The analysis of this 
approach was centered on the statements of the Department of Defense, 
especially Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. Secretary Cheney's position 
has continued to focus on the capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces 
of the Soviet Union, which are continually being modernized. 
The second approach focused on the reality that changes have taken 
place in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. It is recognized that the 
changes have occurred under President Gorbachev, but from the testimony of 
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Director of Intelligence William Webster, it seems likely that even a 
Soviet leadership change would not permit the Soviets to reverse 
completely the reforms of President Gorbachev. Also, it must be believed 
that the testimony of former defense hard liners, such as Richard Perle in 
early 1990, has affected the assessment which Congress conducted in the 
early part of 1990. Mr. Perle's opinion has been that changes are taking 
place that will allow the United States the opportunity for assessment of 
force structure changes. 
Also, the changing international environment with regard to nuclear 
and ballistic missile proliferation has been assessed for a method to 
defend against Third World proliferators. The most likely solution to the 
proliferation probably would be SDI. Of course, the issue of the ABM 
Treaty would arise, but the United States may be able to convince the 
Soviet Union that SDI is additionally in the Soviet Union's interests, 
since the majority of the proliferation is taking place close to Soviet 
borders. The overall benefit of SDI will be discussed with arms control. 
Third, arms control and a START Treaty are portrayed as areas that 
can achieve two goals for the United States. The first goal of arms 
control is to limit weapon systems, particularly between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. It appears that the focal point of arms control for 
the 1990s is the START Treaty and the limitation of strategic nuclear 
weapons. By the very nature of limiting strategic weapons, a fundamental 
desire to lower the strategic nuclear weapon arsenals of the United States 
and the Soviet Union is achieved. It is believed that as strategic 
weapons are limited, the possibility of strategic nuclear war will also 
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diminish. The second goal is that by lowering the quantity of nuclear 
weapons, a budgetary benefit will be obtained. The potential benefit of 
deleting or reducing a strategic weapon system is usually interpreted in 
a positive manner by Congress. 
Additionally, the START Treaty has been negotiated from the 
standpoint of supporting slow-flying strategic bombers and SLCMs, albeit 
not actually a part of the START Treaty. This position is supported by 
both the Bush Administration and the Congress. Of course, a negotiated 
treaty which represents the position of Congress has a better probability 
of being ratified. Also, Congressional endorsement of slow-flyers over 
fast-flying ballistic missiles will have a major impact on the strategic 
nuclear programs which are funded in the future. 
Lastly, the issue of SDI has been removed from the START Treaty; 
therefore, SDI may proceed with two benefits in mind. The first benefit 
would be a cooperative effort with the Soviet Union against nuclear and 
ballistic missile proliferation. Also, an effort to involve the Soviet 
Union and remove their objections of possibly violating the ABM Treaty may 
be a viable reason for Congress to support the development and deployment 
of SDI. The second benefit is that the United States could move toward an 
offensive/defensive strategy with regard to strategic nuclear force 
structure. Ultimately, the final result would be a decrease in the United 
States' offensive strategic nuclear forces and possibly, the requirement 
for United States fast-flying ballistic missiles would cease to exist. 
Fourth, the strategic modernization program has been under 
development since the early years of the Reagan Administration.  The 
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intention of the program was to modernize all three legs of the United 
States strategic nuclear Triad. The focus of the discussion since the 
1983 Scowcroft Commission's report has been the ICBM leg of the Triad. 
The controversial aspect of the ICBM leg has been the choice of a mobile 
system. The two mobile systems that have been proposed are the MX rail- 
mobile and Midgetman road-mobile. The MX has been supported by DoD and 
the Air Force, while the Midgetman has been supported by influential 
leaders in Congress, as well as General Scowcroft. With this split in 
opinion, neither the MX or Midgetman has been recognized as the designated 
mobile missile of choice for the future. It is my opinion a choice has 
not been made because of Congress' perception of the general public not 
supporting strategic nuclear weapons "running around" the countryside. 
As far as the sea-based leg and the strategic bombers, the problem 
has not been a decision on the type of weapon system, but funding the 
program. The sea-based leg has continued to be funded with the successful 
Trident submarine program and the development and deployment of the 
Trident II (D-5) missile. With the success of that Navy program in the 
1980s and early 1990, it appears that the sea-based leg will become the 
premier component of the strategic nuclear force structure for the United 
States. Also, it appears that the strategic bomber leg has retained its 
support, especially with the favorable counting rules of the START Treaty. 
Additionally, it must be mentioned that the strategic bomber leg has 
been successful in deploying the B-1B during the strategic modernization 
program, as well as development and early tests flights on the B-2. Of 
course, the B-2 has encountered funding problems because of its price per 
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plane, but it appears that the B-2 will continue on to production. It is 
my opinion that the B-2 will proceed in development and production, but at 
a lower production quantity from original requests. The reasons for my 
opinion is that Congress has supported the negotiating position which 
favors strategic bombers in a START Treaty; therefore, it is logical to 
support the continued development of the technologically advanced B-2. 
Fifth, Congressional influence must be considered, in my opinion, as 
the most important factor in determining the future strategic nuclear 
force structure of the United States. When reviewing the summary of the 
previous four factors, it must be recognized that Congress played an 
instrumental role. Congress is involved in coordinating the national 
security strategy of the United States with the President, assessing the 
strategic threat, ratifying treaties, and supporting strategic weapon 
systems. In reality, the strategic nuclear force structure of the United 
States is largely determined by the strategic decision-making of Congress. 
It is realized that this statement is contradictory to the traditional 
method of how strategic planning and decision-making should evolve. 
Nonetheless, as far as the future strategic nuclear forces of the United 
States is concerned, it is imperative to recognize the importance of 
Congressional influence, especially the Congressional leadership. Also, 
good salesmanship is increasingly essential when presenting a program for 
Congress. It must be realized that accurate information is vital, because 
the future of a strategic program could be determined by a single instance 
of inaccurate testimony before Congress. 
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In conclusion, it is my opinion from the evidence presented in this 
study, that Congress believes changes are taking place in the 
international environment which afford the United States the opportunity 
to reassess and possibly alter the strategic nuclear Triad. Additionally, 
a START Treaty will make it even more paramount that we look to the future 
and not continue to rely on thinking of past generations with regard to 
the future strategic nuclear force structure. Furthermore, from the 
Defense Policy Review in 1988 on strategic forces in a post-START era, it 
should be acknowledged that Congress has stressed the "key" capabilities 
required for future strategic nuclear forces are survivability and 
flexibility. Also, it must be remembered that the United States is still 
without a solidified position on the mobile ICBM issue. Ultimately, it is 
my opinion the mobile ICBM issue will be decided by Congress, or possibly 
Congress has already made its decision, which is no decision. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
From this study, it is apparent that a new assessment of the 
capabilities of the future strategic nuclear force structure of the United 
States is required. The guidance may not be in writing, but the action or 
lack of action on the mobile ICBM issue by the Bush Administration and 
Congress is a leading indicator for a review on the strategic nuclear 
Triad. At the conclusion, the appropriate answer may be that the 
strategic Triad should remain as the strategic nuclear force structure. 
If the strategic nuclear force structure is to remain the Triad, it is 
readily apparent that the issue of selecting a mobile ICBM must be 
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decided. This necessity exists because the guidance of Congress is 
survivability and flexibility, plus the fiscal constraints of the Defense 
Budget will not economically permit two mobile ICBM systems. 
It is my recommendation, however, that before the strategic nuclear 
Triad is determined to be the correct answer, the Department of Defense 
should reevaluate the issues that have been presented in this study. The 
determination may well be that the changing international environment 
requires a new strategic nuclear force structure for the 1990s and a post- 
START environment. Additionally, a new force structure may prove to be 
more flexible, survivable, feasible and capable than the current strategic 
nuclear Triad. Of course, proponents of the Triad will argue that three 
components are much more likely to achieve the requirements than a force 
based on the Dyad concept. In the end, this may be true, but the real 
essence is that it is time for DoD to reassess new options. 
It must be remembered that the research of this study has focused on 
the policy aspect and not the technology aspect of determining a future 
strategic nuclear force structure. With this in mind, it is opinion that 
DoD should provide guidance to the Air Force and the Navy to conduct 
reassessments of the capabilities and provide recommendations on a new 
strategic nuclear force structure. The guidance should advise the two 
services to take into account the reality of a declining Defense Budget 
and then answer the question: if our current funding continues downward, 
would it not be possibly more stable to have a Dyad fully modernized than 
a Triad that is obsolete and unaffordable? 
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To answer this question, it appears to me that several options for 
improving the strategic nuclear forces should be assessed. These options 
will need to meet the requirement of conducting a wide-range of strategic 
nuclear missions, and yet must be conducive to being sold favorably to 
Congress. It is my opinion that some of the options assessed should be: 
a. The continued support of a strong sea-based leg concentrated on 
the Trident SSBN and the D-5 missile. Also, the possibility of the 
Trident submarine as becoming a dual- or multi-capable platform 
should be analyzed. The increase of mission capability beyond the 
strategic nuclear mission could be in the area of a launch platform 
for satellites or as a Tomahawk platform for the future. In my 
opinion, the concept of being capable to conduct operations other 
than strategic nuclear war, which from this study has been determined 
to be decreasing, warrants innovative ideas for future employment of 
the Trident SSBN in addition to its strategic nuclear mission. Also, 
this approach may be an avenue to keep selling the sea-based leg of 
the strategic nuclear force to the Congress as the Defense Budget 
declines. 
b. With the favorable counting rules for strategic bombers in a 
START Treaty, the strategic bomber leg will be continually modernized 
through technological advancements. At the forefront of the current 
technological breakthroughs is the stealth technology; therefore, the 
B-2 is a necessity. To help acquire support for the B-2, the B-2 
should be promoted through salesmanship of being capable of both 
strategic and conventional weapon delivery. It is recognized that 
this selling point has been utilized, but it is my opinion that the 
dual-capability is vital to the survival of the B-2. Also, it must 
be recommended that if the B-2 should not be supported in the future, 
then the production of B-lBs should be resumed. The flexibility of 
strategic bombers in the changing international environment requires 
the technological advancement of the strategic bomber leg. 
c. The development and deployment of SDI appears to be an option for 
decreasing the threat from strategic offensive weapons. SDI would 
possibly allow the United States to shift its nuclear strategy from 
strictly offensive to an offensive/defensive strategy. Additionally, 
SDI should be sold to Congress as a hedge against a Third World 
nuclear attack or the accidental launch of a nuclear ballistic 
missile. 
These recommendations may not be feasible, but the point to be made 
is that exploration of new concepts are required for the future strategic 
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nuclear forces of the United States. It appears that the opportunity for 
DoD to conduct a reassessment is on the horizon. With this reassessment 
and the resultant recommendations, the salesmanship of the strategic 
forces must be in agreement with the thinking of the Congress. Remember, 
it is not the intention of this study to promote altering the Triad, but 
rather it is necessary to reassess our requirements and ensure the 
appropriate strategic nuclear forces are procured for maintaining the 
national security of the United States. Consequent realities of those 
decisions will determine whether the United States retains its strategic 
nuclear Triad, or shifts increasingly toward a Dyad. 
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